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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Second German Reich can be divided into two very 
distinct periods: the Chancellorship of Bismarck, which 
covered the years 1871 to 1890; and the personal government 
of William II, under the guise of several weak and subservient 
men (Caprivi, Hoehnlohe, BUlow and Bethmann-Hollweg), which 
lasted from 1890 to 1918. 
With the dismissal of Bismarck, the magic touch which 
had been the si8n of his Chancellorship disappeared. His 
"young master", somewhat intoxicated by the taste of power, 
decided to put into practice his own ideas about government. 
These ideas took many forms, embracing everything from social 
legislation to foreign policy. As regards tre latter, 
Caprivi in 1892, and Bulow in 1902-1904, signed various 
commercial treaties with the new large grain producing countries: 
Austria-Hungary, Canada, the United States and Russia. There 
was a twofold purpose behind these treaties: to provide 
markets for the expanding German industries, and to forestall 
social / unrest by providing cheaper foodstuffs. 
While the treaties accomplished the purposes for which 
they had been signed, there were some serious domestic 
repercussions which neither William II nor his ministers had 
fully expected. For, in lowering the tariffs on grain and 
other agricultural products, they damaged the most vital 
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interests of a very articulate class: the agricultural class. 
Included in that category, and the most vociferous of all, 
were the Junkers. 
The name "Junkers", certainly brings to mind no loving 
thoughts, but rather visions of leering, ruthless German 
militarists, responsible for two World Wars, whose sole 
interests seemed to have been aggression abroad and reaction 
at home. But no human being is totally evil, no matter how 
prejudiced, egotistical or narrow-minded he may be. An 
attempt shall be made, in this work, to bring out a fuller 
picture of one of the prominent members of this class during 
the rule of William II. 
First of all, what does the word "Junker" itself mean? 
To what class of people does it apply, and what was the 
setting in which they lived during the early 20th century? 
The word II J unker" comes from medieval German, 1 junc 1 -
or 1 JunYJierr 1 , and means iyoung nobleman'. The term thus 
applies really to the younger sons of noble families. In time, 
it evolved semantically, and came to mean any person claiming 
noble status, who resided in Prussia, and more specifically, 
in the area of Prussia situated east of the river Elbe. 
In this sense, usually reserved to members of the East 
Prussian landed nobility and their relatives in the 
Prussian Army and bureaucracy, the word implies, above 
all, the provocative display of social arrogance and 
intellectual nar r owness, blended with a materialistic 
conception of ethics based on the principle that might 
supersedes right and reasoned discussion. It also 
meant adherence to political and s ocial reaction aiming 
at the preservation or restoration of noble privileges 
in various spheres of public life.l 
1Hans Rosenberg, "The Rise of the Junkers", American 
Historical Review,XXX:XIX, p. 2. Hereafter referred toas: 
Rosenberg, "The Rise of the Junkers" 
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This is the description usually applied to the Junkers, 
prescinding from any personal qualities which would have 
chan ged the picture. In order to be impartial, it is only 
fair to quote Friedrich von Oertzen, one of their number, who 
wrote about them: 
[The Junkers] showed precisely in their quality of big 
landholders and their care for their people, that the real 
attachment to the land made them consider as natural the 
social obligations attached to it, and they saw in it 
the oldest and most important prerogative of true 
Prussian Junkerdom. All the more indicative of the inner 
cleavage which ran through these men is the fact that 
they felt obliged to distinguish between their personal 
attitude and the supposedly necessary political attitudes 
as members of the 'landed gentry'. This distinction in 
their minds, was quite unwitting.l 
The Junker, as a rule, was the possessor of a rather 
small estate --around 100 acres--called the Rittergut, upon 
which he exercised both administrative and judicial functions. 
He was the Landrat, which can best be translated as district 
president, and acted both as mayor and justice of the peace. 
This position of local ruler betrayed one of the characteristics 
of the Junker: he like to rule, and rule absolutely. He 
brooked no interference with his power, thus preserving his 
independence and self-sufficiency. In 1918, there were approx-
imately 18 ,000 Junker families, who owned 20 per cent of all 
2 German farmlands. 
Since the Junker's holdings were usually small, they 
did not provide him with an income sufficient for a life of 
1Friedrich W. von Oertzen, Junker - Preussicher Adel 
im Jahrhundert des Liberalismus (Oldenburg im Osten: G. 
Stalling , 1930). p. 322. Hereafter referred to as: F.W. 
von Oertzen, Junker. 
2Karl Brandt, 11 Junker to the Fore Again , 11 ' 1Foreign 
Affairs , XIV:122. 
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luxury on his estate, and much less so in the city; he 
therefore found it expedient to live on his land, miQ.sling 
freely in his habitat with his servants and tenants. As 
one can readily imagine, this circumstance led to a rather 
limited intellectual horizon. But it also had a distinct 
advantage. By living on his own estates, he accustomed 
himself to hard work. Unlike the nobility in many other 
countries, he never became a parasitical city dweller. The 
result was that the greater part of Junkerdom was endowed 
with great physical strength, tireless energy and good 
health, coupled with imperturbable patriotism. 1 Lif e was 
frugal for him, and the fare monotonous but plentiful. 
Guests and house parties relieved, to some extent, the 
monotony of his rather secluded life.2 
Since the Junker had to live among those whom he 
considered his social inferiors, he was strongly conscious 
of his hereditary privileged position, and was prone to 
insist on his prerogatives. This consciousness of his own 
station in life made him careful not to marry above or below 
his rank, though there were notable exceptions to this rule. 
The great landowners of Eastern Germany were convinced 
that a patriarchal society, based on agriculture, was the 
only desirable one. They could be admirable patriarchs, and 
1Gustave von Schrnoller, Zwanzi~ Jahre Deut scher Politik 
(Munich: Dunker and Rumbolt, 1920) , p . 71. Hereafter referred 
to as: Schmoller, Zwanzig J ahre Deut scher Politik. 
2Elard von Oldenburg- Januschau, Erinnerungen (Leipzig: 
Koehler, 1936), p. 12. Hereafter referred t o a s : Oldenbure-
Januschau, Erinnerungen. 
5 
knew it; their peasants, on the whole, gave them loyal support . 
They would have preferred not to tolerate any other social 
type, but since industry had "insisted" on expanding, they 
felt that the great industrialists should adopt the Junker 
code. 1 In general, these aristocrats th ought in terms of 
land, not money . They were unimpressed by their indebtedness . 
Finally, the Junker ' s spirit of i ndependence led him, 
during the period under consideration, to a sense of tension 
between his loyalty to his sovereign and his determination to 
2 put honor and ideal above obedience to his King . His social 
environment exerted a strong influence on his political 
thoughts and achievements . 
The Junker was a man of action, hardworking , 
disciplined, devoted to the upholding of law and order, 
s~lf-sacrificing for the common good when , in his opinion, 
the latter coincided with his own . At the same time, he 
was an amazing combination of political acwnen and personal 
brutality, self-centered politically and economi cally, always 
ready to sway with the wind in order to carry his point, or 
to improve his profit . The power and greatness of the State 
were of paramount importance in his utterances, but his 
enormous egotism led him at times to place his own interests 
111 Junkers , Return", New Statesman and Nation, III: 789 . 
2For confirmation of the above statement about the 
Junker class, see Lizbeth Muncy , The Junker in the Prussian 
Administration under William II (1888-1914) (Providence : 
Brown University Press, 191µi), pp . 34-37 . 
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above those of his own country, identifying himself with his 
country by an amazing process of rationalization . 1 
The Junkers accepted the rule of the Hohenzollerns 
only grudgingly, because it subtracted from their own authority , 
and they were at first the passionate defenders of localism 
and a smaller Germany. One of their leaders did not hesit a te 
to write later: "We did not hide the fact that the Kais:er_1 
was also criticized in our circles ...•• 112 But the gradual 
importance of Germany ' s role in the affairs of the world 
finally brought them to a better understanding of the problems 
of the hour and, by the time of the fall of Bismarck, they had 
been converted to a policy of limited unification, grudging 
imperialism, and Weltpolitik . 3 
Even though the Junkers ' loya lty belonged to their 
ideal of a monarchy- -Christian, patriarchal and feudal in 
character-- their sense of duty to the masses (mistaken though 
it was), led them at times to take up the fight both against 
a bureaucracy devoted to the King , and against Liberalism . 
They were the proponents of a sound egotism in poll tics , both 
to preserve their own privileges and to save Prussia from 
1 Rosenberg , "The Rise of the Junkers", p . 14. See 
also Oldenburg-Januschau, Er i nnerungen 2 pp . 156-157 . 
2Kuno von Westarp, Konservative Polit i k im letzten 
Jahrzehnt des Kaiserr eiches (Berlin : Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1935) , p., 662. Hereafter referred to as .:. Wes tarp , Konservati ve 
Pol itik . 
3 Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Conservatives and 
Parliamentarization of Imperial Germany", Journal of Central 
Eur_£Peap_.l!_f_ai:r:~. XIV ( 1951) , p . 242 . -
7 
ruin which they thought was threatening her t 1 It was, moreover, 
an egotism which had its roots less in a narrow materialistic 
point of view, or plain -self - centering of interests, than in 
an honorable shortsightedness . The majority of them thought 
seriously that by furthering their own mode of living, they 
would provide the best means of advancement for all . 2 
For the Junker considered himself to be a bulwark 
ordained by God and Hight to uphold government and order, 
and he thought of himself as honor-bound to perform paternal-
istic duties towards his subordinates . This duty was not a 
subject of discussion, for it came to him naturally, as some-
thing which belonged to him by the very fact that he was born 
a Junker. 
As one of them declared quite frankly, "thus it came 
to pass that while Prussia and Germany have to be governed , 
they are unable to do so themselves. 113 This attitude on the 
part of one of the leading Junkers was the natural result of 
this sense of duty and paternalistic obligation which is one 
of the distinguishing marks of the medieval ideal of the 
lmight . In mnny respects, the Junker class was an anachronistic 
survival of the Middle Ages, which had managed by sheer endurance 
1
schulthess 1 
Beck , 1867-l , P . 74- . 
Geschichtskalender . 
Europaischer Geschichtskalender (Muni ch : 
Hereafter·referrect to as : Schulthess ' 
2Wilhelm Massow , Die Deutsche Innere Politik unt er Kaiser 
Wilhelm II (Berlin : Verlagaenstalt , 1913), p . 159 . Hereafter 
referred 'to as: Massow, ~utsche Pol~. 
3stenogra~hische Berichte der Verhandlungen des 
Reichstags, (Berlin , 1867 - •.. ) , CCXC , 5691 . Hereafter 
referred to as: VerhandJungeq . 
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and political sharpness to vJ'J l; :-, r the crises which had destroyed 
or blunted the nobility of "uru ., and to bring before the 
wondering eyes of the ':1or ln t'i ,icture of the lost knightly 
class. 
However, durin ~ the per l'ld under consider a ti on--the 
Empire of 1-lilliam II, from 1 -) co 1918--the Junkers, while 
still professinc alleciancc t Ll1eir King, were progressively 
drifting away from his banner. ,jne of the leading independent 
newspapers of the period 'J:C'ot J in 1910: 
What difference docs l t ; 8.' q to the Junkers--who were for 
centuries the most tenacio .w and hateful opponents of 
the Hohenzollerns, and 'J}lo,..,r) _loyalty to the King dates 
only from the time when ho ,; rnrted to do their ·bidding--
what difference does it P11: :e that the King wants to have 
pence with his people':' Tho Jepresent ative has thus 
expressed one of tho noru n'Lrnd forms of offense to the 
Kingtl 
Tho reason the Jun1:o:..0 ::; ·ive for their defection was 
that the policies of tho Gcrr: ',n '}ovemment no longer coincided 
with the interests of their cl·.~ s, that therefore they no 
longer satisfied the needs or th 9 German people as a whole. 
How was this momentous shiC't (lCc ::>mplished? What brought it 
to pass, and how did tho lccuc1°~ of t hi s movement rationalize 
it? rrhe best annwer to these ri.u.sstions can be found by 
examining the personality an, .1 olitical activities of one of 
their outstanding membor:J, ~~l rtr 1 von Oldenburg-Januschau. 
----------- - ---.. 
1Frankfurter . Zei t 1m·,·, J,:nuary 30, 1910. 
CHAPTER II 
YOUTH AND WELTANSCHAUIDiJ"G 
When, after eighteen yearst absence from the 
parliamentary scene, Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau was 
elected to the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic in 1930, the 
official newspaper of the Democratic Party, the Vossische 
Zeitung, made the following comment on his maiden speech: 
An interesting anachronismt Looking at this spry old 
man, one would scarcely believe he is 75 years old. 
But if one listens to him, it is hard to realize 
that he was born only in the middle of the 19th 
centurytl 
Though one can always say of a 75 year-old depty that he is 
an "interesting anachronism11 , there is more than that involved 
in this remark by a political opponent. The explanation can 
be found in the life of von Oldenburg-Januschau, as well as in 
his opinions on the political and social events of the German 
Empire. 
Born March 20, 1855, he was promptly christened Elard, 
Maria, Kurt, Fuerchtegott von Oldenburg. He was the third 
son of his father's second wife, and therefore a very junior 
member of the family. His father owned a big farm at Beisleiden, 
Kreis Eylau, in East Prussia. A somewhat progressive agriculturist, 
the older von Oldenburg had been the first to introduce the 
1vossische Zeitung, October 19, 1930. 
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cultivation of closer as cattle feed, as well as the first to 
introduce artificial fertilizer into East Prussia. So efficient 
was he as a farmer that he had succeeded, at the time of his 
death, in lifting a 150,000 mark mortgage on his farm, in · 
addition to leaving a dowry of 150,000 marks to each of his 
two daughters. 1 
For his primary education, young Elard and his older 
brothers (the .eldest had died as an infant) had the 
services of a private tutor. Though the latter tried his 
best to instill some learning into the minds of the rebellious 
youngsters, he was not very successful. 
In 1868, when Elard was barely thirteen, his mother 
died. His father remarried promptly, and still another 
sister was born. Thus there were nine children altogether 
in the family. Only four, however, two boys and two girls, 
reached adulthood. 
In the year of his mother's death, Elard and his 
brother were sent to the Gymnasium at Konigsberg, but neither 
of them distinguished himself as a scholar. In 1869, they 
were sent to Wernigerode in Harz, where, to his great disappoint-
ment, young Elard von Oldenburg was confined to bed with typhus 
during the stirring days of the Franco-Prussian War. None of 
the schools he attended could hold his attention very long, 
and he usually was expelled either for scholastic deficiencies 
or as the ringleader in some student riot. The latter fate 
terminated his scholastic c.areer at the Ri tterakademie in 
201denburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 10. 
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Berlin in 187.5. In that same year his father, despairing of 
ever making a scholar out of his son, secured an appointment 
for him in the Imperial Guard. Young von Oldenburg was 
shipped to Berlin, where he entered the crack 2nd Regiment 
of Guard Uhlans. Thus, in 187.5, Elard von Oldenburg became 
a Second Lieutenant in the service of the Emperor. For 
eight years, he was to enjoy the life of a gay young blade, 
a careless spendthrift, and fancy-free. In later years he 
recounted, with great amusement, how one of his friends and 
he raced down Unter den Linden, in the fashion of Roman 
charioteers, just to win a bottle of wine. On another 
occasion, he and three of his companions, most likely drunk, 
gave the incorrect address of the residence where they were 
going to attend a party. The cab dropped them in front of a 
strange house • . Undaunted, they rang the bell, and were 
admitted into a splendid palace, but quite unlike the one 
they had expected. Realizing a little belatedly that some 
mistake had be-en made, they were ready to make a quiet exit, 
when the door of the living room opened and Prince Bismarck 
appeared. Amid embarrassed excuses on their part, he invited 
them inside, and offered them Some beer. A few minutes later, 
they proceeded to their rightful destination . l 
In 1883, tragedy struck the family. His elder brother 
became very ill and died. Von Oldenburg ' s father decided that 
it was time for the young man to learn how to manage an estate, 
1 oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 24. 
> 
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and bought him rJanuschaur in West Prussia. Elard had to 
resign his military service, something which he regretted 
all his life. rJanuschau' was a big affair for a beginner. 
It embraced 3,000 acres, and had a net income of 30,000 
marks per year. It contained 10 remow.1ts, 20 cows and aromid 
3,000 sheep. It was worked by two farmhands and an overseer, 
the income from wheat alone amounting to 33,000 m·arks per 
year. However, the manor house contained only three furnished 
rooms. To help him get a start, his generous stepmother 
gave him silverware for 12 and dishes for 24 settings. 1 
To prevent his son from engaging in ruinous activities, 
the father wisely kept a large mortgage on the farm . 
In 1884, Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau - for such 
Was his full name now, in accordance with the custom of adding 
to the family name the name of the estate - married Agnes 
von Kanitz, the sister of the famous parliamentarian, Count 
Kanitz. 
In 1885, the estate of Brausen and the forest of 
Zollnich were added to Januschau, bringing von Oldenburg ' s 
total landholdings to around 7,000 acres. 
When his father died in 1888, von Oldenburg al so took 
over the management of Beisleiden for his young nephew. He 
carried out this additional task willingly and with dispatch. 
At this turning-point of his career (1890), it might 
be well to mention some of the personal characteristics and 
Political thoughts which were to exert a great influence on 
10.ldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen.i. P. 33. 
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his life. 
In the course of his long life, von Oldenburg-
Januschau was to become a big landholder, and this enabled 
him to achieve financial independence, and permitted him to 
pay attention to national affairs. In this respect, he 
differed from the majority oi' the Junkers who could not 
afford to live in the city or engage in parliamentary life. 1 
His holdings, which were constantly augmented throughout 
hi3 life, eventually amounted to about 17,000 acres, quite 
an estate indeed. In 1905, and again · in 1910, he rounded out 
his estates by buying Sardinein and Lichterfeld, outside of 
Berlin. 2 The total area of h is holdings then reached 17,000 
acres, with an income of 70,000 marks per year. The interests 
on his mortgages crune to 35,000 marks, leaving him a sizable 
amount of money for his personal use. Heavily mortgaged at 
fir~t, he succeeded in clearing it rapidly of any encumbrances. 
He himself set an example for others as an agricultural expert. 
He was helped in his experimentation by the varied soil 
conditions prevailing on his lands, which were scattered over 
the eastern portion of Prussia. 
The Junkers were forced to resort to the latest 
methods of intensive agriculture in order to keep pace with 
falling prices of agricultural commodities and rising wages 
for their farm workers. Thus . they were caught in an econ-
omic squeeze which at times induced them to take extreme measures, 
----- ·---
1Ibid., p. 4. 
2when he bought Lichterfeld, he had already become a 
famous parliamentarian. It prompted one of the opposition 
newspapers to remark: "Oldenburg ante portast 11 
14 
as will be pointed out later. 
Von Oldenburg was of medium height, in later life 
quite rotund, and endowed with an iron constitution. There 
is only one illness mentioned in his Memoir..E_, typhus, as we 
have already observed. During Wo11 ld War I, he joined the 
Army in the field as a reserve officer, and even commanded 
a regiment in action at the age of 61, an experience he 
enjoyed tremendously. 
He was endowed with a great sense of humor, and 
was very witty. This most refreshing part of his character 
was to serve him well in life, although it was to make him 
an exception among his peers, who were not exactly qui ck-
witted as a rule. 
Von Oldenburg's character, however, was typically 
Prussian. He related how, when he was a small boy, he would 
ask his relatives who had served in the army to tell him 
about their war experiences. 1 Very early, he realized that 
his whole life, dependent on the income from his estates, was 
going to fluctuate with "the two basic element s worrying 
every farmer: the weather, and the prices of agricultural 
commodities." 2 
He was naturally authoritarian and disregarded other 
people I s opinions as worthless when they did not agree with 
his own. But he never allowed the correctness of his own 
---·--- ... 
1 Oldenburg-Januschau, Er.!E.£._~~'7~1}_, p. l~ .. 
2
_Ib iq., p. 43. 
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opinions to be questioned: 11 I am still right; the others are 
the blockheads . 111 
Living on the land, among his people , he firmly 
believed he knew what was best for their needs and con-
cerns • 
. . .. I am a friand of the German people , and I know exactly 
what its needs are . I spent my whole life living with 
the German people - [gales of laughter among the Social 
Democratic benches] . I will explain it to you : I gr ew 
up on the land, I played with the chi l dren from the 
village; I was a soldier, and I t r aine d the sons of 
the people ; I have lived for 22 years with the people 
on the land and in the cities , not with the people that 
you [the S.D . ] have filled with hatred , but with the 
monarchical, God-fearing people which are still the 
majority in Germany , thank the Lord . 2 
Like other Junkers, von 0ldenbure believed that the 
primary duty of a nobleman was to protect the little people, 
in fulfillment of an "age- old p1"'erogativo" . When he tried 
to implement what to him had seemed right, he did it with 
the firm conviction that his long acquaintanceship with the 
German people at large made him their friend and protector . 
He once fired one of his field hands because he had dared to 
vote for a Social Democratic candidate , for 11 he wanted to 
be the only one who made politics on his estates 11 . 3 When he 
himself could not fulfill his duties, he strongly advocated 
that the State take part in this paternalistic approach to 
government . He felt , however, that this selfless attitude 
1schulthess i Ges chi chtskalender (1910) , p . 90 . 
2verhandlunzen, XI Leg . Per . , II sess ., IV , p . 880 . 
3Ibid . , XI Leg . Per . , I sess . , III, p . 2147 . 
b 
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had gone too far under the Empire . 
Bismarck and William I had a twofold program against 
the Social Democrats : repression and social legis-
lation . We shall agree to more social legi slati on only 
if the people get off the Social Democratic bandwagon 
upon which they have been chased by the fear of losing 
their jobs . I · 
The correct measure to be attained is indicated by 
the very motto · of Prussia ' s "Su.um c~ique 11 which 11 does not 
mean, in the last analysis, that the State should forthwith 
eive each one his own; no , it also means that the State should 
receive his own for it 1112 
Consequently , von Oldenburg felt that labor unions 
were unnecessary, if the workers were treated right . He 
asserted that 11 the agri cultural journeymen spit on the right 
of coalition . " The solution of the relationship between 
workers and employers was not to be found in the unions , but 
in the just wage and in the employer ' s interest in the living 
conditions of his employees • 
.... r above all hope and wish that unemployment insurance 
shall be repealed by this House with flying colors . 3 
Thus he advocated the transfer of the old s oc ial 
relati onship between Jandowner and h i red farm workers to the 
f. 1 · ie d of industry . He failed to realize that the relationship 
between employer and employee in an industrial society is 
different from that prevailing in an agricultural society . He 
1 
~ ., CCXXVIII, 1299 . 
20ldenburg-Januschau, Er ipnerungen , p . 93 . 
3verhandlun~en , XI Leg . Per ., I sess ., III, 2245 . 
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said: 11 the difference is that, in industry, the relationship 
is only one of money, whereas on the land, it is also a 
1 Personal one." He perceived t _he cause, but not the remedy . 
In spite of its faults, the German government was 
almost ideal in its present form: Germany had " the most 
liberal constitution in the world l II For, in what other 
country was there provision for a single Chamber , elected 
by universal suf'frage, with no Upper House to control it?2 
But this Constitution had not been sworn to by the Emperor ; it 
iiras the gracious grant of the All-Highest and of his brother-
Kings , a grant which had met with their sanction . It could 
always be revoked, and was by no means to be considered 
permanent . The rrocher de bronze r foundation of this Con-
stitution was the authority of the Hohenzollerns, who had 
"stabilized conditions in Germany by the means of the drum 
and a big stick . 11 Thus did he show his contempt for the 
brother-Kings, who had to be coerced into unification l 
The German people, however, had taken advantage of 
'Bismarck rs mistake ' - namely, the democratization of the Reich 
by means of a constitution applying equally to all . Democracy, 
as it had ' degenerated r in Germany, was a rpoison' second to 
none in destroying the minds and the virtue of the German 
People t He bore no particular love for the 1 bourgeois 
society , either.: 
1Ibid . , p . 448. 
20ldenburg-Januschau, Erinner ungen, p . 202 . 
The bourgeois society is determined to save its skin 
in the most ruthless fashion •••• the bourgeois society 
shows, in its overwhelming majority, the will and the 
strength to resist the hateful provocation (of the 
Socialists) but it also expects the allied governments 
to lead unified resistance.I 
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Von Oldenburg consistently and most energetically 
fought the 'encroachments' of the constitutionally-minded 
Socialists. The whole Social-Democratic movement gave him 
the impression of "being a speculation on the stupidity of 
the masses." It was for the Social . Democrats that he 
reserved his most pointed barbs, it was towards their 
representatives in Parliament that he exhibited his greatest 
verbal brutality: "one should take the most stringest measures 
against the Social Democrats: one should send them to Africa, 
and if they are successful there, it would always be time 
enough to have them take over Germany. 112 One of the weaknesses 
of the German Empire is that it continues to tolerate 
unnecessarily the Socialist agitation, that it tolerates 
the Socialists at all. Towards the elected representatives 
of the hapless Socialists, he was no more considerate. 
When the aged Bebel once permitted himself t o make a remark 
which von Oldenburg found offensive, he did not hesitate to 
t e ll him so: 11 0ne can see that you and I have a different 
conception of the meaning of the word 1honori; if it comes 
to a test, my concept of it will seem s uperior to yours. 11 3 
------ --
lverhandlungen: XI Leg. Per., II sess., IV, 2879, 
Underscoring for emph asis mine. 
2
verhand lU11;g~12 : XI Le g. Per., I sess., III, 1676. 
3I bi ~ ., IX Leg. Per., I sess., II, 403. 
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Sarcasm was not spared either: 
~•lhen one listens to Representative Bebel speaking with 
such authority on foreign affairs, one must regret that 
he never will be in a position of becoming Chancellor. 
For then we all would witness his colossal discomfiture 11 
Von Oldenburg declared that "it is a wonderful delusion 
among our parliamentary circles that Germany can be governed 
by a p arliamentary re r.; ime •112 His contempt for democratic 
processes knew almost no limit, and when pressed about his 
record at an electoral meetin g in his district, he calmly 
announced that, as far as he was concerned, "he was more 
interested in knowing how many sucklings one of his sows 
at Januschau would have than what was in the speech Representa-
tive Richter g ave yesterday. 113 
When he was a young officer, it "seemed (to him) 
somewhat preposterous to see that 400 men felt themselves 
obliged to want to govern alongside with my grand old King 
and his great Chancellor1 11 4 His loyalty belonged to the 
Kaiser, rather than to the country. "We stand for •••. a 
strong monartjl~ ••• Thereby only shall we have a sure basis in 
life and in d~ath. 11 5 He further dee lared: "we think that the 
1
.I.,bid., XI Leg. Per., II sess. III, 2352. 
20ldenburg-Januschau , ~rinner un gen, p. 199. 
301denburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, . p. 65. 
4ve~handlungen, CCXXX, 2913. 
50ldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 201. 
present task of the German people is to make itself strong 
enough to bash in the skulls of anybody--be he inside or 
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outside of Germany--who dares attempt to tarnish the halo of 
the Imperial throne . 111 In another of his speephes , he turned 
toward the Socialists, and told them that "if for you the 
Emperor is an institution, for us he is a person . And we 
shall serve His Majesty personally , as long as we live , fear -
lessly and to our la.st breath, ac c ording to the old tradition 111 2 
The House of Hohenzollern must be a strong foundation 
for Prussia, and Prussia must be strong enough to enable her 
King to protect the other feeble member-states of the Empire . 
"A weak Prussia would lead to unity , and unity in turn would 
only lead to a German· Republic . 113 Lvhat an unwitting display of 
foresight t Thus, in the German Empire of 1871 , the J unkers 
saw nothing more than an enlarged Prussia . The old Emperor 
himself had said so , and even if , according to the Constitution , 
the other States were independent , they still in fact 
11 depencled upon the .Prussian bayonet t 11 4 
For no other group of people ever s o brazenly 
thought that "might makes right" than the J unkers . In this 
respect, von Oldenburg-Januschau was no exception , 5 and to 
him the embodiment of this theory was the Prussian Army. The 
German State was founded on the two strong pillars of a healthy 
agriculture and a strong army . The two went ne cessarily hand 
1verhanq_lill1;g~ , XI Leg . Per . , II sess . , I , JO . 
2K.reu~zei tllr_IB, , Novembe1~ 12, 1908 . 
301denburg-Januschau, Erinne~~cen , p . 201 . 
4schult1l~.E-s~_q-esc1l_~cht_~a_lender, (1906), p . 117 . 
501denburg-Januschau, Er~~g~~l¥1~~ ' p . 93 . 
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in hand: for only the invigorating life on the land could 
provide good, strong men capable of forming an army large 
enough to give adequate protection to Germany. 1 In this he 
was supported by his Emperor, who declared: 
I laid emphasis on the fact that East Prussia, being 
chiefly an agricultural province, must above all 
support and maintain an energetic peasantry capable of 
being the pillar and mainstay of my monarchy.2 
Oldenburg underscored this, maintaining that the 
safety of the Imperial crown depended mainly on a large number 
of independent small people, rather than on the 11 big fortunes". 
Very ear ly in life, von Oldenburg became a staunch 
advocate of the idea that there was no higher ideal for a 
Prussian nobleman than to serve his King. He "belonged to 
his King and to hi s country heart and soul, and had no other 
objective in life as a young man than to become a soldier. 11 4 
Any attack whatsoever on the Army, no matter how 
justified the point of criticism might be, always was the 
starting signal for a diatribe against its author. Most of 
von Oldenburg's speeches, both in and out of the Reichstag, 
were devoted to that subject, and one of the leaders of the 
Conservative Party in the Reichstag once remarked that: 
1 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, pp.63, 198. 
2 W. H. Dawson, "The German Agrarian Movement 11 , 
Con~mEorary Review, LXXX:VII:73. 
3verhandl~~-~ ' XI Leg. Per. I ses s., III, 2148. 
401denburg-Januschau, Erinn~1:ilgen, p. 14. 
We defended above all the tradition which bound us, the 
Prussian nobility, to the Army. The Prussian kings 
had brought the nobility into the Army - and this ~on 
Oldenburg never tired of emphasizing in his effective 
way. It wao his assignment to defend these priceless 
values a g ainst democratic equalization, party politics 
and a nti-militaristic internationalism.l 
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As the head of the Army, the Emperor enjoyed an 
indi s putable constitutional right to command it. This power 
,-vas the link between the throne and its main instrument, and 
a necessary prerogative in -order to avoid excesses.2 
The relationship between Kaiser and officer was 
purely personal, so much so, in fact, t ha t nothing and nobody -
p r e ss, public opinion or Reichstag - could influence the mind 
of the 1rJ ar Lord against one of hi. s officers .3 The Officer 
Corp s of which von Oldenburg was a reserve member wit h the 
rank of Rt ttmei~t~L.1:,.D .- was frequently criticized for its 
arrogance and its mores. But it was 11 a wonderful entity, 
.for better or for worse", and attacks against it would be 
construed as personal offenses t The All-Highest enjoyed 
irremovable rights in its management : he could appoint 
officers, but above all, he had to arbitrate affairs of honor 
and the results of courtmartial against officers.4 The king 
had the right to name or transfer commanding officers, and 
1 
Kuno von Westarp, 11 Aus Meinen Erinnergungen11 , 
Preussische Jahrbucher, v. 235, pt. I, p. 51.~. 
2 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 108. 
3vorhand lun.13.!?-Q , CCXXX, 2912. 
► 
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the Reichstag has no power to interfere with these powers of 
the All-Highest . History will demonstrate what the Prussian 
officer corps has done by way of example not only for the 
Germany Army, but for the armies of the whole world. 1 During 
one of the Reichstag debates, von Oldenburg struck the note 
th
at so clearly described the attitude of the typical German 
officer 
' 
including its strong and weak points: 
Much has been said here in the last few days about the 
part the Officer Corps should take in politics. Its 
Participation has been condemned by all parties; and 
rightly so. We condemn it most energetically, because 
t~e Officer Corps does not want to have anyti1ing to do 
With politics, and should have nothing to do with 
Politics.2 
But almost with the same breath he limited his pro-
nouncement by declaring that "if a Prussian general were to 
st
and here (in the Reichstag) as a representative of the 
Gel'.'rnan Army, and somebody would attack a vital institution 
of the officer corps, it would be 
its r·'gh 3 
::i. ts most ene1"getically. 11 
no doubt his duty to defend 
In his opinion, the recent 
Pard0n of two duelling officers again established the fact 
th
at n~ither the Press today, nor the so-called 'public 
Opinionr had the least influence in the decisions which came 
from the lawful sources of authority and dealt with the behavior 
of the German officers. Even though it was a sad thing that 
duels still took place, they were a necessity, lest the spirit 
Of the Of 4 ficer Corps _sufferl 
1Verhandlungen., IX Leg. Per., I sess., II, 167,5. 
2 
~., CCLIX, 8969 . 
3Ibl£ ., CCXXX, 2912. 
4verhand~1¥1Re~ , x Leg. Per., II sess., IX, 896.5 . 
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The 'esprit de corpsr was certainly strong. Von Oldenburg 
also gave a good description of the qualities required of an 
ideal field-comm~nder when he wrote during World War I: first 
th ought must 
always be given to morale; discipline in the 
field should i 
not be too severe, and fear should not beds-
Played i f 
n ront of the men. 
German citizens had one honorable duty; namely that 
of becoming soliders. 1 Naturally, the Army required discipline, 
for if f 0 ficers were def'enseless against the ranks, the natural 
resu1 t would be t It th ... he collapse of' the system. was ere.i.ore 
abaolut 1 
e Y necessary that the men, af'ter a strenuous maneuver, 
Should be d forced to pull themselves together once more, an 
th
at th ey should present a decent f'ront, quite apart from 
the fact 2 that the II goose-step II was an excellent discipline• 
From his i 
e.xperience as a soldier, 11he could only say, th at t 
is an 
excellent discipline and a good means for developing 
mora1 t 
s rength to straighten up in the saddle after a tiring 
field d · 
ay and to conclude the exercises with an r•eyes right' 
and a f 3 d 0 rmation march.'' Discipline was certainly a goo 
thing, and it 1 proved that the German citizen had, as a rue, 
Very steaay and iron nervesl The old ways of dealing with 
de11nque I 
the old 
nts wer•e unquestionably better than the new ones· n 
days, one knew only · 11 oral proceedings", that is to 
say ''b " 
~t" - and there was never any "injustice t 
l_y0.£.1land l ung ~n, CCXXVIII Leg. Per., II sess., IX, l069 • 
2
~ . , 1070. 
3
,Yerhand,1_u.qg_~, IX Leg. Per., I sess., II, 1675. 
The Army was a necessary means to inculcate discipline 
into the average German citizen, to teach him the value of 
obedience. "If we did not need an Army and a Navy to defend 
our Fatherland, which is open on all sides, then they would 
have to be invented, as the best educational method for 
Germany. 111 Thus, war, or the threat of war, was absolutely 
necessary; in peace times, the greatest qualities of a nation 
or of a person did not manifest themselves. This last opinion 
is very similar to the one that had been formulated by 
Treitschke during the crisis of the unification of Germany, 
when he mo.intained that "peace is but a pipe dream". 
'11he Army must naturally be one of compulsory service. 
Bebel once proposed that, in order to cut costs, the German 
military command ought to explore the possibilities of a 
militia army, as it was customary in Sweden and in Switzer-
land, but von Oldenburg rejected his proposal with the two 
fol lowing arguments: 
a) We do not like the way in which this matter is 
handled in these two countries. 
b) After all, it does not make any difference 
whether thene two countries have an army or no army 
at a1112 
Even while holding some of these opinions, von 
Oldenburg remained a deeply religious man. He stated his 
convictions as follows: "I am an Evangelical Lutheran by 
birth, upbringing and conviction. I belong to that class of 
people who cannot be budged from their convictions. 11 3 Even 
1 Verh~ndlungen, CCXXVIII Leg. Per., I sess., II, 1071. 
2
~., ccx:x:x:, 29ll~ .. 
301denburg-Januschau, Eri~~£.!:!ng~n, p. 89. 
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in religion 11 he was rightl" He did not hesitate to urge 
th
at German universities take positive action on religious 
questions, since the German people as a whole were deeply 
religious. 
CHAPTER III 
GRAIN FOR GAIN (1893 - 1902) 
With the death of his father in 1888, the politically 
inactive part of von Oldenburg's life came to a close. By 
sheer coincidence, of course, William I, the II grand old 
Emperor", and Frederick III, the ill-fated "Emperor for 
100 days", died during the same year. Less than two years 
later, Prince von Bismarck, the founder of ,the Second German 
Reich, the Iron Chancellor, was ungraciously dismissed by his 
tyoung master' William II. If Louis XIV was purported to 
have said: 11 LtEtat, c'est moi", one could very well ascribe 
to the new German Emperor an aopcryphal: 11 Moi, je suis ltEtat". 
For Bismarckts dismissal marked the beginning of the personal 
g overnment of the German Emperor. The Reich had been created 
by the Iron Chancellor, and had been tailored to his measure. 
It would have taken a man of his political stature to continue 
his work successfully. The very intricate system of 
alliances, as well as the delicate balance which had been 
struck at home, required great deftness, coupled with good 
knowledee of the forces at work. Unfortunately, neither 
Willirun II nor his advisers possessed either one. From 
this time on, it was to be a policy of trial and error, in 
foreign as well as in domestic affairs. And the result was 
to be mostly error. 
The separation of the offices of Chancellor of the 
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Reich from that of Prussian Prime Minister was, altogether, an 
unfortunate solution to the existing difficulties. Bismarck 
himself had said that the Constitution was not designed for 
such a separation of powers . 1 By 1892, the existing grievances 
swiftly camo to the surface because harmony was lacking in 
high Places , and thus the germs of a crisis were always at 
hand. Even though the goal was desirable in itself it 
seemed to many people that the right standards of action were 
not co 
rrectly applied . As a result of this, criticism itself 
Went out of proportion for it became fashionable to criticize 
everything, and to see failure, pettiness, false appearances 
everywhere. Every event was scanned with mistrust in order 
to extract from it a reason for criticism which, unfortunately, 
did not stop short of the Kaiser . Even the latter's severe 
Warnings that h · i th ugh his new e was not. going to give n o 
Policies were · i t d wn the wave a·" criticized, could not qu e o ~ 
distrust that 
also swept monarchical circles and made itself 
event: 1 
· e t in the Conservative Party• 
At the same time, the opposition between agricultural 
a
nd indust~i·ai Its cause could 4 economy became ever sharper. 
be traced t the politics of 0 the commercial policy which, in 
th
e Rei· th 
ch, had. occupied the dominant position during e 
Period of legislative reform. Bismarckrs concept of anchoring 
German economic life on moderate protective tariffs met with 
increased 1 · tical 
support . Those who understood German po 1 
economy advocated rightly, therefore, that Germany should try ~
1 
Massow, Deutsche Politik, P• 128. 
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to reach an economic understanding with those countries which 
Pltt"sued simi l ar ta.riff policies. Such an understanding should 
take th .p 
e ~orm of long-term trade treaties. Caprivi, the Iron 
Cha.ncellort s successor, adopted this point of view, thereby 
Performing a great service to the German economy. 1 He had 
always di t 
s rusted agrarianism, and went so far as to assert 
th
at, together with anti-Semitism, it should be ranked with 
one of the anarchical elements in the country. 2 Socialism as 
Thus, in the 
course of 1891, economic treaties were signed 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. The 
With 
agricuit 11-al interests h t iff li to 
......,_. interpreted t e new ar po cy 
mean that t hey had been sacrificed to help industry overcome 
a serious 
economic situation. For the first time, a purely 
agrarian opposition raised its head: the Junkers, and their 
Conservative 1 
allies, were forced to switch from a genera 
lea.dersh1 P, according to their political theories, to a pure 
defense 
of their agrarian interests.3 
The reason f'or the struggle is evident• Large land0wners 
Were face· d with the f specter of insolvency and disaster, or 
th0Y Were caught in a tremendous fall in agricultural prices,4 
at a t1rn 
e When they had overcapitalized their estates to 
.rnoderniz · h standards ~ methods in the hope of meet:I. ng big er 
l 
Massow, Deutsche Politik, p. 133. 
~iew-, 2W • H • Daws on "The German Agrarian Movement 11 , Contemporary ,..,. 
·------. 
1XXXVrr , P • 7 2 . 
3 
P. W. von Oertzen, Junker, p. 318 ff. 
~ 4A f' • heat declined from 
ta ton 1 8ew examples will tell the story. w208 a ton in 1890 
o 11 118 n 1 90 to M 135 in 1894; rye, from .M had a 
airn11a.ri in 1894. Every single agricultural commodity 
Y disastrous decline in those four years. 
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of living• Th e income from their investment was so small 
a led to cover the interest on their that in many cases it f i 
tnortgages.l Thus, they had to resort to violent methods in 
order t 0 obtain relief. Though the fault did not lie with 
them ' this sit~ation brought to full flower their selfishness 
and their materialism. 
At this time, the average Junker enjoyed an income 
equal i . hi ' n most cases, to between 1 percent and 2 percent of 
s investment. 2 A return of 3 percent was a rarity. 
Simu1t aneously, there 
the urb 
was a growing movement of rural workers 
to r an centers, caused by the rapid industrialization 
o Ge:t'Illan y. As a consequence, wages of the remaining farm 
liork ers steadily increased. The reaction of the Junkers, 
caught in the economic vice, was swift and violent. 






tariff on agricultural products, thereby . 
to obtain more favorable conditions for her 
industrial exports. It ·1ed von Oldenburg to remark later: 
You hav you h e been spoiled during the caprivi regime,,,,for 
fore ave come to believe that the German peasant is 
it ever obliged to deliver foodstuffs to you cheaper than 
land 08t" him to produce them in Germany. The German to dworker lived miserably his wife worked herself nearly 
ea.th ' accon, • and miracles of work and effort have been 
last Plished; all with the net result that within the 
landhl5 years (1890-19051 the indebtedness of the German 
mark Olding class has increased by hundreds of millions of 
- s •••• J,,ny endangering of the (agricultural] capital 
~Germany auJ.ine Anderson, Back rowid of Anti-En 11sh Feelin 1 lp
~~39), P iJ1890-1902) (Was 1ng on: American Univ, Fress, 
--t.._Anti-E • Hereafter referred to as: Anderson, ru,.ckgroun£ 
nglish Feeling. · . 
201 denburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, P· 74• 
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would mean endangering the food supplies in the cities, 
and a l so endangering a great proportion of our national 
patrimony.I 
A protective tariff for German agricultut'e became 
more urgent, not only because of the threat to agrarian 
' ut because the national food supply might be capital b 
endangered. Therefore, said von Oldenburg: 
I think . · Germ this is just the right moment to strengthen 
feedf agriculture: for it is alone capable of 
ng •• !_.the German people in critical times.2 
That th is last statement proved to be a fallacy was not 
understood at the time. fu11y 
Why was von Oldenburg able to make such a statement 
in the Reichstag in 1905? What provided him with a spring-
board 0 politics strong enough to insure his election? int · ' 
His first appearance on the political scene began 
call to arms was issued in 1893 for the formation of -When a 
a stron g Pressure group to support the interests of the · 
ing classes in Germany. ThiS ·appeal, innocently buried landhold 
dull agrarian newspaper, was to revolutionize 
in politics. It was written by a Thurin-
in the columns of a 
the J 
u.nker s I course 
g1an ·1 . t and10rd ' Rupprecht -Pansen, Who was not a JunJ<:er, 
he Ea.st p russian landlords seized upon it as the occasion of 
8.Wa.k ening the 
e.:x:tinction 
''w e tnust c di ease to win elections for the Gover!ll11•nt in our 
st:r-icts 1 a ruthless ·rinteressenpolitik' 
--. ••••we must strive to a.pp y - . . 
But 
agrarian class as a whole to the danger of 
to which it was exposed. The article read in part: 
l Verhandlungen, XI Leg. Per., II sess., I, 29, 
21.bid., I JO 
- XI Leg. Per., I sass., , • 
•••. for only in that way can present-day agriculture be 
savedt 111 What precipitated such a shift in the allegiance 
of the Junkers? While the reasons for it have been dis-
cussed, the result should now be examined. 
In 1893 - the same year in which the appeal had 
appeared - a pressure group was organized. It was called 
the tBund der Landwirte', which had a phenomenal growth. 
Its immediate aims were to "unite all agrarian interests, 
draw the small peasants into their [the Junkers•] orbit, 
and act as a pressure group in the Land tag." How well it 
succeeded at this oan be treasured by the fact that in 10 
years, :it enlisted close to 250,000 members. Four-fifths 
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of this number, or approximately 200,000, were · small 
landholders whose interests did not always coincide exactly 
with those of the big Junkers. 2 The latter nevertheless 
quickly seized control of the organization by infiltrating 
the top-level Council. In 1903, eight out of the twenty-
three members of the Executive Council, were big landholders. 
This new group, vociferous and powerful in the extreme, 
gave von Oldenburg an opportunity to use his many political 
talents. As one of the big proprietors of West Prussia, he 
was made a member of the founding council, and was rewarded 
for his activities by being named vice-president, and later 
president, of the organization in his province. Henceforth, 
1Johannes Ziekursch, Politische Geschichte des 
neuen Deutschen Kaiserreiches {Frankfurt -am-Main, 1930), III, p. 59, 
2 Anderson, Background of Anti-English Feeling, p. 135. 
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he was to b e in the forefront in promoting the Bund's policies. 
His Well-known talents as an orator, for example, were 
Uti . lized to their fullest extent by making him deliver the 
a ress at the Bund'S meeting in the 1Circus annua1 keynote dd 
-
!_usch, i 
- ' n Berlin. This general meeting was usually quite 
an affair 
' 
with anywhere from two to three thousand members 
attending. 
The implementation of these long-range policies 
Was entruat ed to their representatives in troReichstag. 
Once there . ' a handful of ultra-agrarians led by Wangenheim, 
Hahn R •• ' osicke, Oertel, Lucke, and later, von Oldenburg-
Januschau 'by the violence of their language, their un-
sing attitude, by their unmeasured demands and compromi . 
their . 
skillful tactics, contrived to attain a degree of 
imp ortance far out of proportion to their actual streng
th
• 
They and Nmade their allies the Conservatives, CentriS
t
s 
in th ational Liberals 'believe that they represented 
Part ~ir mode of thinking a .much more considerable 
case f the rural electorate than was actually the 
on the and thus they succeeded in imposing their wi}l 
rest of the agrarian army in the Rei.chstag. 
The:y-t organized a system of terrorizing the great body of 
he 'M n . oderates•. These agrarian fire-eaters, small in 
'Umber th Ough they . were, misled also com:pletelY the Im:perial 
Govei, 11 nment itself; inc.lading Prince BllloW, by their strategy• 
?l.dei, th b ese conditions, the Imperial. Government honestly 
elieved i that their excessive demands for protective dut es 
every kind represented the on 
....____ of agricultural product reallY 
J;:lection 1w;;ihelm von Schierbrand, "Results of th• 4Ge!'ffian 




Wishes of the great bulk of the fanning class, and was finally 
to frame a new bill. In the period from 1893 to 1914, 
von 01 
Persuaded 
denburg i th . welded a great influence in the framing of 
e goals Of the Bund d -' an his voice was always listened to 
With great deferen. ce· by l the Council, 
Jectives of the~ were varied, but all of The ob· 
to obtain higher prices for the foodstuffs pro-them sought 
It called for adequate customs duties duced b Y its membe 
r 
rs. 
or the protection reducti of agricultural products. It .opposed the 
t 
on of existing duties and requested that no commercial 
!'eati ' 
es such as thei those signed by Caprivi, which might have "" 
r result be off the reduction of German agricultural tariffs, 
ered eith mor er to Russia or to other countries. It demanded 
e Protection for agriculture and its allied industries, 
as Well as th Prohi e prohibition on the irr,portation of cattle; tbi• 
bition 'Vent1n should be achieved by sanitary regulations pre-
g the 1 entry of any cattle into Germany, ;hose supply 
:n cattle was Chea already abundant enough. In order to obtain 
Per money with 
Of th 
e ~und 
which to pay off their debts, the Junker~ 
der Landwirte advocated a policy of bi-metallism, 
same way as the •Silverites• did in the united rnuch 1 
Stat es 
n the 
at that time. 
Toe a ncourage 
gx,1cu1t llral 
agriculture and the use of till newest 
processes, the Bund demanded legislation to 
th -e formation of Chambers of Agriculture. To keep Pl'omote 
....____ 
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a Plentiful supply of cheap labor on the land, legislation 
upon domicil e, free migration and breach of contract by the 
labo:r-e:r-s was added to the list. Revision of labor insurance 
legislati on, whereby the burden would be transferred from 
the employers to the whole community, was requested. Finally, 
to CU:t>b the profits of the grain intermediaries, the~ 
asked f o:r- State control of the grain exchanges, revision of 
the land laws , and redistribution of taxation •
1 
As far as .foreign policy was concerned, the 1?.,_un2 was 
not silent. It promoted the support of a strong Army and a 
e Navy, the latter step being a conciliatory move tnoderat . 
towa:r-d 8 their allies, the National Liberals. It favored a 
colonial policy which would not conflict with their own 
interest 3 by providing cheap agricultural produce for GeI'Illan 
tna:r-ket s 2 
• 
That the Bund der Landwirte was a .gigantic pressure 
devoted to a single purpose, cannot be denied. No 
that William II speaking on September 6, 1894, B few 
Weeks b ' efore Caprivi;s resignation, complained 
th
at: 
The · this word •opposition• has come to my earsl Gentlemen, is opposition of Prussian nobles against 
th
el.r Kin/! 
Whe~ monstrous thing! Opposition is justifiable only 
the King himself stands at its head.3 
~•• the~ obtained some measure of relief 
!le lw R s also 1udwig 
(~rgstrass~ • Dawson, OE· cit., PP• 70-71 • t ~:n in Deutschla').!c! 
annheim r, Geschichte der Politischen Pg e~ 
' 19 2U') , P • 12B • . 
P. 128. 
3w H • • Dawson, op. cit., P• 73• 
for it 3 members by working within the framework of the existing 
laws · One of the very clever ways in which this was done was 
the manipulation of the 1 Identitatsscheine'. This document, 
necess ary to obtain a rebate on duties on grain imported into 
ge or grain previously exported, was modi-Ge:r>many in exchan f . 
fied to include only tonnage, and not quality of grain. This 
enabled th 
t 
e Junkers to export their harvest and then sell 
he tI 
t 
at a discount to grain brokers, who 
_d_e __ n;.;.t~i:.;t~a~·t~s~s~c~h~e?Ji~!!?.' 
hen i mported grain from abroad at cheaper prices, and duty-
f:r>ee • The extent of this traffic can be appreciated by stating 
that i 
n 1911, out of a total consumption of seven billion 
hundred million marks of duties alone were thus tna.:r>k s 
, five 
e"IJ'a.ded . Ir the war of 1914 had started in September, Ger-
tna.n,r 
h 
ave been left without enough breadstuffs to carry 
"Would h 
e:r, t o the ~ next harvest.l ThUS, the effect of the 3 mark 70 
clu.t y- Which h cou ad been provided for in the Caprivi treaties, 
Pled With the alteration of the •importation certfl'icates• 
was more effective from the Junkers' point of view in 1893 
' 
5 mark per ton duty under Bismarck, This, however tha.n ·· the 
<lid not satisfy von Oldenburg. 
The Bis t n n marckis.n Wheat Tariff of 5 Mk per ton was even 
Prices O ~onger sufficient to stop th• declin~ in 
.!/.h.~i~ ecause the freight rates of the Americ~ 
if one g lines fell in s.n impredictable manner, and 
WO.Uld really wanted to make up a just taril'f • ,<bich 
WOUJ.d ~qual in value the old 5 Mk tariff, this fact 
....____ ave to be taken into account-
2 
lF • W. von Oertzen, Junke~, PP• 331-33
2
• 
2 Yerhandlun3en, XI Leg. per., I sess, III, 2146. 
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Nothing short of the moon would have satisfied him& He 
ascribed the decline f E wool O ast Prussia to the collapse of the 
Prices whi h fl ' c forced the JunkeI'S · to give up their profitable 
Ocks ' and to take up tunprofitable' cattle.
1 
Anyway, 
tariffs would ~ 11liddl not provide a cure to the marasmua, for the 
••men d 2 an the city taxes were to blame for most of it. 
But' unless the 
~ could get representatives elected 
to th e Reichstag it would find itself at a disadvantage 
in ' its fight for survival. The creation of a party machinery 
long Was a and difficult task at best, and the simplest 
so1ut1 on to th With is problem was to have a worlcing arranganeilt 
one of th Choi e existing right-wing parties. The logical 
ce was the a Conservative Party, for it had always had 
:t>ather l arge proportion of Junkers among its members. 
•id arrangement proved to be advantageous to both This 
es of devot the bargain. The Conservative party acquired a 
ed f' l th O lowing in a class it bad not conquered before, and 
e&..__~ received the adequate parliamentar:Y support, necessaI"Y 
the Passage f 3 :f'o:r, 0 its measures by the Reichstag. 




nd the Empire, accomplish the shift in allegiance 
s sal:'y 
qu.esti on 
for it this s new role? The best way to answer 
is to examine the path taJ<:en in national politioS bY 
1 
~~ad VI n lungen, XI Leg. Per., I sess. ' 
4706. 
2 lbid _., XI, Leg. Per., II sess. III, Jl• 
3 Ludwig Bergstrasser 
' 




Von Oldenburg, for his rise and fall in the Reichstag are 
Closely linked with the decisive influence of the agrarian 
element i 
s n the Conservative Party. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE JUNKER AND BULOW (1902 - 1909) 
The attempt t . . Chambers O rule with the present system of 
failed ~uS t be regarded as having entirely 
absurdit _onstitutionalism for Prussia is an 
governme!t we can only manage with one form of 
ority, wheththat of an absolute governing auth-
republica er exercised by a Monarchy or a 
Minister n dictatorship. When I first became a 
comparis~nI ~as a radical constitutionalist, in 
now only i w th my attitude nowadays. I believe 
n absolutism for Prussia. 
Bismarck, ( 186.5) 
Since the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, and until 
von 01 denburgr Ch s arrival in the Reichstag in 1902, three 
had already attempted to fill Bismarck's shoes: 




to . 1900·  ' , and, since 1900, Prince BllloW, The latter•• accession 
Powerr was · Wh marked by a continuation of the vacillations 
ich had 
0 
diSt inguished the reigns of his predecessors. If 
ap:t-1vi h 1 ad believed that the "only way to retain the rapidl-Y 
ncreas1 an ng population in 
d not people 1 .. 
a1 , Bulow, 
togeth er s the uccessful, decided to try another approach to 
same the a problem. However, this decision had been aided by 
Germany itself was to export products 
seeing that this policy had not been 
PPearance on 1 bl 8enti the Reichstag scene of several very vo u • 
emen of th blance 
------:. Conservative hue, who bore a marked rosem 
1 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerunge__g, P• 3
8
• 
to the Executive Council of the Bund der Landwirte. Some of 
them had been elected before Bulowts accession, but the 
majority, riding on the crest of a reactionary wave to the 
right, arrived in the Reichstag after the 1903 elections. 
Among the newcomers, but hardly a newcomer to politics, 
was Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau. Bravely ignoring his 
distaste for parliamentary doings, he had consented to let 
himself be elected to the Prussian Landtag in 1901. In 1902, 
he was persuaded to run for the Reichstag, in the electoral 
district of Elbing-Marienburg, in West Prussia. In spite of 
the fact that he undertook to serve his mandate "only against 
my will, and only to defer to the wishes of the people of 
West Prussia11 , 1 this extreme modesty did not prevent him 
from seeking re-election until his defeat in 1912 retired 
him from the political scene of pre-war Germany. 
His appearance did not fail to create disturbancesl 
He had been chosen in a by-election, the national elections 
having taken place in 1900. The absolute majority in the 
Elbing-Marienburg district, - which it was necessary to obtain 
in order to win in the first round, - consisted of 9200 votes. 
Von Oldenburg gathered 9205. One could imagine the opposition 
was not going to let the matter rest there. Several 
irregularities were detected: he had failed to send in his 
acceptance of the mandate within the prescribed limit; he 
had failed to submit proof that he was an eligible candidate; 
and there had been some rather high-handed methods employed 
to tperauadet rural voters to put his name on the ballot. 
1Ibid., p. 61. 
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F'U!-ther.rnore b 
' allots bearing the name of his leading opponent hact 
, in .man 
Y mysterious ways, been disqualified. The net ?>es 11, 
~t of the i 
the n nqui.ry into the validity of his mandate led 
neichsta.g 
commission to recommend, on February 17, 1903, that-
• 
·•the el 
Ela.rd :ction of Representative Ritter-futsbesitzer 
Distric~n Oldenburg-Januschau in the f rst electora1
1 of the Danzig Province be declared invalid. 
Meanwhile 
, after his relectionr, von Oldenburg had 
~l>i'V d 
e in Berlin, declaring that "after all, his constituents haa al 
so a. right 
to see some fireworks in the Reichstag. 11 
lle Proved himself to be very useful to the Conservative Pal:'t;y-, 




e Imperial Government. His gift as a speaker, his 
Q.nd his 
fearlessness made him the point of the Con-
ael'>'Vat1 , 




s always feared that his highly rcolorful• and live 1 ~ speeches 1 iti th bl wou d endanger their pos on on e pro em 
at han d. 
But it was precisely this plastic expression, this g:t.tt t . 
or Parliamentary jousts, this deftness with a bon mot 
°'ih.tch 
lllade him a "main party workhorse and a well-known 
Polit:t.c1a " 2 
F n, always a "ready expert on military affairs". 
l:':t, 8 nds 
and foes alike would appreciate his explosion, and 
even th 
e Social Democrats would sometimes be provoked into 
€al.es or ~ laughter by his repartees. On other occasions, 
Ot-,e'Ver 
~Pless Socialists did not fare so well. On the 
1Yerha.ndlungen, x Leg. Per., II Sess., AktenstUKe VI, 5819. 
2
Westarp, Konservative Politik, PP• 196, 243-
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1st of May 1906, for example, the May Day celebrations ran 
afoul of the police, and there was some bloodshed. Two days 
later, in the Reichstag, von Oldenburg had the following 
solace to offer: 
The elements which have compromised themselves 
politically on the 1st of May, let them be thrown outL 
Our domestic supply of revolutionaries is ample 
enough, so much so in fact, t~at we could make 
an article of export thereof& 
This solicitous remark drew the following commentary 
from the Freie Presse, which called him the "bloodthirsty 
stable-hand from Januschau" .2 
If some controversial measure was being discussed, 
and the heads of the party did not lmow exactly what couroo 
to take, the Januschauer went into the fray, bravely holding 
his own. One of the leading German newspapers, the Munchner 
Allgemeine Zeitung, remarked, apropos the weight of his words: 
[Herr von Oldenburg) does not speak as a visionary, nor 
as a twildrnant. He speaks as one of the best-known 
spokesmen of his Party, the Conservative Party; he 
speaks as one of the men who are sent out, in diffi-
cult spots, to say more clearly than Herr von Heydebrand 
can, or wants to, what the Conservatives' position is. 
Thus Hr. von Oldenburg is the unmolested representative 
of his Party, and what he says is important, not because 
it is what Hr. von Oldenburg alone thinks, but what the 
Prussian Conservatives think.3 
If he was substantiated by later votes, all the better; but 
his Party was not above disowning his opinions publicly, once 
1yerhandlungen, XI Leg. Per., II Sess., IV, 2879. 
2Die Freie Presse, May 5, 1906. 
3:M"unchner Allgemeine Zeitung. February 5, 1910. 
43 
he had 
served his purpose as a trial balloon. 1 
The main objection of the Junkers up to now had been 
Caprivits reduction of the agricultural tariffs in his long-
term 
commercial treaties. These treaties, signed between 1892 
a?ld 1=-894, Were t be li h Old b o va d for 12 years. T us, von en urg 
a:rarived 
on the scene at the very crucial moment when the 
question of their 
renewal was before the Reichstag. Their 
l'ene'W'al 
' and further reductions in the tariffs, was the 
Objective 
of the .Social Democrats. The Conservative Party, 
no.., t'UJ.ly 
under Junker control, was naturally violently 
OJ>Posed to 
such policies. Not only should the treaties be 
a1101-1ed 
to lapse, and the duties be maintained at their 
P?>esent . 
levels, but the tariffs should be raised, so that 
the 
agricultural class may once more reap some profits. 
Bu1o'W' "W"as 
now willing to meet them halfway. The change in 
€ove 
•• rnznenta1 position was brought about by two factors: 
Bu1 
o1-1 "W"anted to secure the adherence o:r the Agrarians to the 
1rnp e :ra 1 al 
military and the naval programs; he also wanted to 
Check the 2 
w-as a1-1are 
"American invasion". Furthermore, of course, he 
that as long as agriculture did not come out of its 
~er~ rea1 slump, he 
would obtain nothing but unconditional 
opl>os1tion 
from the Conservative Party. In governmental 
C1.?:>cle 
s, it was realized that only too many of the Agrariansr 
cornp1a1 
~st Caprivi_'s treaties had been justified in 
G!--lnto , 
1
Edwin Maxey, "The Political Situation in Germany", 
~_BeviewLXXV; 227. 
2 . 





act. It was further understood that it was no 
longel:' 
Possible to obtain foreign tariff reductions for Ger-
m.an 
e)q:>orts in exchange of an unequivocal sacrifice of Ger-
nian;y, s a 
gricultural population 1 This was the situation which h . • 
ad Pl"ornpted 
von Oldenburg to remark that the 11 agricultural 
Population had _quite 
naturally lost all confidence in govern-
lllenta1 l 
eadership, since among the successors of Bismarck, 
the:r-e had not 
been one who had led it to victory; it had been 
engaged in a 2 
continuous rear-guard action1 11 Bulow could 
not si 
mpl;y renew the commercial treaties, as they had originally 
been si 
gtled. In the following year, this realization pro-
"okect b 
itter fights in the ·Reichstag. Both sides attacked 
the 
P:t>oposed revisions: on the Left, the Socialists did not 
t-re.11t an 
Y revisions at all; on the Right, the Conservatives did 
l'lot think they 
were enough. Among the latter, von Oldenburg 
€S.ve th 
e best expression to their thoughts. If tbe old 
ta_l'iff Of 
5 marks per ton were reinstated, as Bulow proposed, 
:t t lvollld 
no longer be enough. Even an additional 50 pfennigs 
:Pe:r, to 11 f-or wmat would not cover adequately the declira in 
i'l'eigh t 
charges, and would not put the cultivation of food-
stutr 
s in Germany on a "paying basis" .3 And yet, the fact 
that B"" 
SOJJt 
Ulow had provided .for minimum tariffs was held up as a 
of heroisml ~ Von Oldenburg went on to explain the 
~assow, Deutsche Politik, p. 212. 
2
.Yerhandlungen, xr Leg. Per., I Sess., III, 2147. 
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Agraria 
nsr objections to the new tariff. The cattle tariffs, 
for instance, would not bring an appreciabie increase in the 
Prices Paid• 
For, instead of a head tax, provision was now 
made for a Weight tax.l What a pity, he said, that agri-
CUltur 
e and industry had to quarrel. Under Bismarck, both 
0btain d 
e What they needed. Nowadays, he maintained, though 
their inte.,,,ests 
~- were identical, one had to be careful that 
the industrial 
tariffs did not take away what the agricultural 
tariffs had pnovided.2 hi th d 
• Furthermore, and t s mus ave ma e 
the c 
hance11or slightly uneasy, 
~~e honorable Prince Bulow would be mistaken if he 
y inks he can get the Navy and Army budgets passed next 
1ear .!;!,_ith the help of the Center alone, and without at 
~eiast assuring us of decent agricultural conditions by 
a sing the minimum tariffrJ 
'.!'he c 
onservatives now resorted to unadulterated blac.larlail to 
attain their objectivesl Bulow, hoping to abate the storm to 
some d 
egree, declared that "Germany would no longer be known 
as 
an industrial State, but rather would it be called from 
.?lolv on an 
'agricultural and ind us trial Stater. 11 All this, 
how-ever , was to no avail. After remarking that "the Chancellor 
has done 
something for us: he made wonderful speeches, and 
he W'as ,. 11 h d very nice to us, 11 4 but that it was a "legend he a 
done 
anything for agriculture, von Oldenburg calmly voted 
!E:ainn .... ~ the new tariff schedules designed to protect wheat 
a.n.d 0 attie,5 ............__ ____ _ 
1
.Y,erhandlungen, XI Leg. Per., I Sess., III, 2146. 
2l,biz2. 
3Ibid., italics mine. 
4.n,1a., p. 447. 
5_yerhandlunge!!L CCLXVI, 5991. 
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Thu 8 
Bulow Was made to regret his bold words, and all he could 
hope f 
or now was to be buried under the following epitaph: 
111.J" 
"iere r t 
es s an agricultural Chancellor". At least he had a 
sense of humor! But he could not resist making a parting 
Shot at the Bund der Landwirte: 
!~~ interests of agriculture were certainly taken 
a.ndeb seriously at heart by the federated governments 
Land Y the majority of this House than by the Bund der 
- Wirte ••.• As far as those members of the Bund who 
Vot d -the against the tariff are concerned, the tservicest 
whfY rendered to agriculture stand as far behind those 
for ch the federated governments and the Majority per-
Wor~~f as Negation and Criticism stand behind positive 
Von Oldenburg had the last word, however: "graduated 
next t 0 last" was his answer to the Chancellorl 2 
For the Bund did not deem the results satisfactory 
-enou,.,.1,., 
6l-', and the Conservatives now entered upon a policy of 
deliberate 
and cynical obstruction, still claiming to be the 
die .. h 
ard supporters of the tmisguidedt Emperor. 
Meanwhile, von Oldenburg had gone home, shortly to 
be 
re .. elected. In the election of June 18, 1903, he succeeded 
\i.t tho t 
u trouble, and his seat was awarded him by the Reichstag 
Collllnission. 
Occasional support for Btnow was provided by von 
Oldenbtu:>g. Later, he admitted that "it must be admitted B0ulow 
knew how t O ,,3 And h th i is o.P master political forces. wen e er s ~ 
-----~----
1·verhandlun~en, X Leg., Per., II Sess., VII, 7742. 
20ldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 70. 
3Ibid., p. 85. 
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l906 developed with the Center Party, he did not 
hes1 tat 
e to say: "Tell B•ulow that we shall shout rHurrahl' if! 
he di 
ssolves the Reichstag". This prompted bis t'riend, one 
Of th 8 
leadez,s ot' the Conservative t'raction, Ernest von 
1Iey-debz,and 
und der Lasa, to ask pointedly: "Oldenburg, what 
1s it that 
you know?" Oldenburg answered . that be lmew nothing lnol"e th 
an anybody else, bµt that the Centerrs proposal [to 
l'eca11 
troops t'rom the colonies] was an attack upon the right to 
command 
of the Emperor, and that Bulow could not let this Pass l 
• This is truly what did happen. The Reichstag was 
disso1 
Ved, and new elections were held. The Parties ot' the 
~~t~I' . 
h e Victorious in these elections, the Center Party 
e1d its 
own, and the Social Democrats lost almost halt' their 
seats 
b • The year 1907 proved to be the high-water mark t'or 
oth the 
the Conservative Party and Bulow. For the last time in Germ 
any Prior to 1914 was a Chancellor to have a working 
?lla.j or1 ty.• 
the Buiow Bloc, or rBlue-Black Bloor. Composed Of . 
a coalition ot' Conservatives, National Liberals and the 
Center 
' this Bloc was to hold together until 1909. Oldenburg ha.ct 00
I'rectly gauged the temper ot' the country, when he had 
toJ.d B•• 
Ulow bet'ore the elections ot' 1907: "You can rest assured 
that tvhen 
the Prussian gets a tug on the reins, his tail will 
fly in 
the air1rr2 
On yet another occasion, von Oldenburg supported the 
Chance11 
~ong controversies raged in the Reichstag t'rom 
1 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, P• 87. 
2 J.b id • , p • 8 9 • 
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They were caused by B~iowts introduction .of an 
1905 to 1907. 
eJcpl"opri at ion 
i.11 P l"U.s s i ri.., 
and resettlement Bill directed against the Poles~ 
-...1 Poland. 
or the Bil 1 as it was framed: 
Von Oldenburg himself was not in favor 
I Was no 'H k . the th a atistr, because I was reconciled with 
State O~ght that we did have Prussian citizens in our 
far as w. 0 were of Polish nationality. It sufficed, as 
Peopi I was concerned, that these members of the Polish 
Zens. e fischar~e loyally their duties as Prussian citi- · 
these was not of the opinion one had to exterminate 
manpowPeop11e. They supplied our Anny with valuable er. 
It, however, they refused to comply, and were disloyal 
to~ 
ermany, then "we must have their lands". The policies 
Of the Ch 
,, ancellor found full approval in East Prussia, for 
ive mu.st k 
1 eep the Province of Posen in the German Reich and nth 
e Kingdom of Prussia; if possible, we would like to 
Ge.?>manize it. rr2 
When Bulow presented the measure in the 
P.?>u.s Si 
an Herrenhaus von Oldenburg was the only one to support it ' the.!'e 3 
• However, when the Bill was presented in the 
Re1chst 
ag, there occurred one of those amusing incidents with 
i.th1ch h 
is Parliamentary career is replete. Recalled suddenly 
t2>om a 
Va.ca ti on at .Januschau by a telegram from Heyde brand, --
\ro,n O 
ldenburg was briefed in Berlin about a speech which the 
leader o.P ~ the faction wanted him to make. 
You li Co Ve in West Prussia, are a member of the Executive 
Yomrnittee of the 'Landwirtschaftskammerr; furthermore, 
~o the . same body in the Bundder Landmrte, 
l 
Oldenburg-.Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 90. Italics mine. 
2 
.Y,erhandlungen, XI Leg. Per., I Sess., VII, 5349-
-¾! .. J1e1d :~osenberg, "The Rise of the .J~kers 11 , Amerio.an Histori-
~, XXXXIX, (191.µJ.), p. 552 • . 
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and you represent a West Prussian District in the 
Reichstag, which entitles you to a seat on the 
Resettlement Commission. You must therefore speak for 
the Conservative Party. We cannot commit ourselves now 
about our vote in the second and third readings, because 
the Bill can still be altered. Consequently, you must 
leave all issues open. At the same time, you must 
express your astonishment that the Government could 
differ with us on such an important question. You must 
finally point out that the loyal Poles have nothing to 
fear from us. Terminate your speech on a patriotic 
note. You will have to speak last.l 
Understandably, Oldenburg asked why Heydebrand could 
not say these things himself. "Tte situation is too delicate. 
If I take a firm attitude, then the Party will have to take 
the same. But if you do so, we can always disavow you. We 
could then discuss the wording of our disavowal, and you'll 
laugh it offt 112 
That von Oldenburg's speech was effective can be 
seen by the results that were obtained. The law was passed, 
but in such an emasculated form, and with so, many of the 
offensive provisos toned down, that it never really became 
effective. But the Chancellor ·had 11 a cool head and a con-
queror's heart. May he long be spared for the Fatherlandt 11 3 
This occasional support of Bulow did not deter him 
from his obstructionist tactics. In 1909, a financial reform 
became necessary in Germany in order to meet the increased 
expenses incurred by re-armament and the building of the 
Navy. To provide additional funds, BUlow introduced a Bill 
to establish an estate-duty tax. 
lo1denburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 92. 
2Ibid. 
3
verhandlungen, CCXXXVIII, 1280. 
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But von Oldenburg sensed that the Chancellor had 
lost the Emperor's confidence because of the Daily Telegraph 
episode. He felt that the measure would be defeated, if 
the Chancellor's bluff were called. In a speech to _the 
yearly Conservative Convention in West Pruss i a, he s aid in 
part: 
The speech of the Reich Chancellor •••• will result in an 
appreciable shift of political allegiances, and an equally 
appreciable change in the Conservative Partyrs attitude 
towards him ••.•• It would mean the end of the Blockpolitik, 
and the passing of the Conservative Party into the 
opposition. The estate-duty tax is unacceptable to the 
Party ••..• Threats of resignation will succeed no longer 
in changing our opinion ••.•. We will stand protectively 
before the King, and retreat before no one ••••• l 
Von Oldenburg vigorously opposed the Bill, and 
introduced an amendment providing for a graduated income tax 
as a fairer means of providing the needed revenue. 
Meanwhile, taking the very ground from under both 
Bulow•s and his own measures, he denied that the Reichstag 
had the right to establish direct taxes1 
We stand on the grounds that indirect taxation belongs 
to the Reich, while direct imposts are the preserve of 
the various States and cities. To try and give the 
Reich the right to impose direct taxes would mean a 
breakdown of the system. The Bund der Landwirte sees 
an enormous danger to the existence of the States in the 
projected increase of direct taxation, and foresees even 
the destruction of their independence.2 
To preserve their economic position, the Junkers were 
willing to resort to a States• Rights attitude. Of course, 
1Y2rwarts, January 22, 1909. Italics mine. 
2 Verhandlungen, CCXXXVI, 7874. 
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the main reason behind their opposition was that the 
proposed tax would hit them the hardest, for land is always 
easily taxable. Furthermore, they were opposed to it because 
it would act as a •publication tax i, that is to say, every 
time someone died, an inventory of the estate would have to 
be made, which could then be used both as a basis for further 
taxes, or as a check on the exactness of previous declarations . 
•• The Bu:nd der Landwirte suddenly realized that Bulow 
was not going to yield on this important issue. It decided 
that no concessions would be made to the Blockpolit~k, that 
pressure would be applied in the State Landtags against 
the measure. Of course, it instructed its representatives 
in the Reichstag to vote against the measure, come what 
may. 1 Enough support . was mustered to defeat Bulowts Bill, 
and, as a result, the Chancellor was dismissed by the ~peror. 
Thus, von Oldenburg, the Junker, the main pillar of Law and 
Order, was instrumental in bringing about the fall of a 
German Chancellorl This was really quite a' shift of 
allegiance•: from the throne to the portemonnaie. As Count 
Westarp, the parliamentary Whip of the Conservatives put it: 
"we did not want to surrender the wallet of the landholder 
to the Reichstag12 
In spite · of the fact that von Oldenburg did not believe 
in democratic government and in parliamentary power, one must 
~und der Landwirte Conference, February 22, 1909; 
Dr . Hahn was the speaker. For a more complete report on this 
Conference, see the Berlin newspapers of February 23, 1909. 
2 Westarp, Konservative Politik, p. 272. 
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admit that he showed a remarkable grasp of parliamentary 
tactics, and that he knew astonishingly well how to maneuver 
for advantage under their complicated rules. For once the 
Bu.low Bill had been defeated, he calmly engineered the death 
of his own substitute; 1 it had achieved its purpose very well 
indeodl This somewhat unprincipled procedure did not strike 
him as such, because, as was pointed out earlier, the Junker 
identified his own interests with those of the country at 
large, and what seemed best to him was to be attained by all 
means, fair or foul. Naturally, he offered no advice for 
covering of the mounting deficit in the Reich's finances, 
other than that "we shall never agree to appropriations 
without cover". 2 
The parting shot towards Bulow, that he "should behave 
according to custom: take it, shut up and go" was justified 
by the fact that, after all, the Chancellor was "no Prussian1 11 3 
Political friendship is such a fickle thing, and it never 
survives a threat to wealth. 
1westarp, Konservative Politik1 p. 126. 
2verhandlungen, CCXXXVI, 6230. 
301denburg-Jnnuschau, Erinner-ungen, p. 102. 
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CHAPTER V 
11 A LIEUTENANT AND Tb:N MEN" 
The King of Prussia, Emperor of Germany, must be 
able at all times to tell a lieutenant: take ten 
men, and close the Reichstag\ 
Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau 
Von Oldenburgis opposition was not limited to 
Bulow's Chancellorship. It continued unabated under his 
successor, Bethmann-Hollweg. The latter did not lack courage, 
and one of his first remarks in the Reichstag was to the 
effect that "[he] did not wait on the Parliament; as little 
did he wait on the Junkers, and on the Socialistst 111 
There was indeed one piece of unfinished business 
... 
which Bulow left to his successor. This was the electoral 
reform for Prussia promised in the speech from the throne. 
This reform was a concession to the liberal elements of the 
Bloc and was certainly overdue in Prussia, where the three-
class suffrage was still enforced, with its attendant abuses. 
But since the principal beneficiaries of these abuses were 
the Junkers, one can understand that von Oldenburg would 
oppose the reform with all the resources at his command. The 
first volley was fired on February 22, 1909, at the Bund der 
Landwirte Convention in the Circus Busch. It was carefully 
1verhandlun5en, CCLXII, p. 3544. 
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explained by von Oldenburg that Prince Bismarck, the creator 
of our national Constitution, had counterbalanced the right 
to vote with the payment of indirect taxes. He had thus 
provided a counterweight to the Reichstag in the conserva-
tive constitutions of the federated States. But it had been 
the unfortunate truth that when one of the States started a 
constitutional revision, all others followed. This would 
also happen if Prussia at this time would give the example. 
Two years ago, the so-called "small constitutit.onal amendment" 
had been passed. "At the time, I stupidly agreed to it. 11 
Ten more seats were created, and the Social Democrats immed-
iately grabbed seven of them. "Now, the cry is raised again 
that tthe Prussian Constitution has outlived itself; it must 
be changed.' If the Prussian Constitution falls, the dyke 
that guarantees a smooth operation of the governmental machinery, 
that binds a quiet population to a strong monarchy, will break. 
Then we shall witness a flood of the first magnitude, which 
shall wash away the pillars. The Throne will crash, and the 
tEinheitsstaatt will emerge from the rubble, the first step 
in the direction of the Ge~man Republic. 111 
With these constitutional views to buttress him, von 
Oldenburg undertook, in his own inimitable way, to torpedo 
the proposal. He admitted in the Reichstag that 11 it was a 
very difficult step for me to approve the measure. 112 When 
howls of disbelief arose, he quietly re-ascended the podium, 
1Frankfurter Zeitung, February 23, 1909. 
2 Verhandlungen, CCLXVII, 7055. 
to put the finishing touch to the sentence: 
As I was an opponent or the law - [ahar cries on the 
Social Democratic benches] - as I was an opponent of 
the law, I voted for these particular paragraphs, after 
the federated governments had expressed thep- opinion 
that the law would be unacceptable to theml 
It was as simple as that. All one had to do was to 
think it out. The real reasons, of course, were quite 
different. 
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Prussia should rid herself of the domination of this small 
group of East Elbian landholders, who are so backward. 
This was to be the goal, which the electoral reform was 
supposed to have attained. It did not.2 
In the Polish resettlement question, the estate-
duty bill, and the electoral reform proposals, the Junkers 
felt their very existence threatened. And it wast These 
bills had been a three-pronged attack to weaken their grip on 
the Prussian government and land. It was designed, as von 
Oldenburg very aptly remarked, to bring the Prussian Con-
stitution up-to-date, to correct some of the more glaring 
defects in a document which had endured essentially unchanged 
from the middle of the 19th century to the first decade of 
the 20th. The readjustment which the Conservative Party and 
the Junkers refused to authorize in Prussia in 1909 - 1910, 
Lloyd George was to push through the English Parliament one 
year later, against the bitter opposition of the House of Lords. 
Bu·t; there was no such check on the lords, power in Germany. 
Only one way remained open to bring about the necessary change: 
1Verhandlunge£,CCLXVII, 7060. 
2schmoller, Zwanzig Jahre Deutscher Politik, p. 65. 
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revolution. And this is the tragedy of the Junkers' 
stubbornness and blindness, that they could not adjust them-
selves to the new conditons, but that they rather tried to 
adjust conditions to suit themselves. They truly tried 
"to push the clock back", a herculean effort in which they 
very nearly succeeded, but in which they were ultimately 
fated to fail. 
But von Oldenburg realized that sane lip service 
was due the Emperor. This prompted him to make his most 
famous speech in the Reichstag, January 29, 1910. At the 
time, the debate was raging over some of the more excessive 
aspects of the Armyrs discipline. The rJanusch~', taking 
it as a personal offense, took to the rostrum and delivered 
a diatribe against the Parliament's interference into the 
affairs of the Army, and proceeded to show what esteem he 
had of their rights. 
What happens nowadays? When a lieutenant is coughing 
audibly somewhere in a corner, he has always to fear 
that somebody might mention it in a Reichstag session. 
That does not matter too much in itself; but what we 
have to see to, is that he should never have to fear 
that any kind of importance be attached to an opinion 
uttered by the Reichstag, for this was not customary 
in former times. 
Gentlemen; the officer corps is harmed by such 
occurrencest _It necessarily has to suffer from them, 
because of its being a class that is personally closely 
linked to the Supreme Commander and which, on the other 
hand, is not at all concerned with public opinionl 
[shouts on the left] 
Yes, gentlemen, this, too, is an old Prussian tradition, 
with which you do not agree, as I well understand. 
The King of Prussia must at any time be in a position 
to say to a lieutenant: 'Go, and take ten men, and close 
the Reichstagl' . 
We discussed this case already once before, gentlemen, 
therefore let us be brief now; all I wanted was to please 
youl After all, there is only one thing one shouilid wish 
for: that the very same tradition, which made our A:rmy 
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great, may survive in future times in our officer corps. 
We from the right wing do hope that the Honorable Mini-
ster of War in Prussia will be willing to maintain this 
tradition as far as the composition as well as the unity 
of the officer corps is concerned: the old, the royally 
Prussian Traditionl Goodbye, gentlemen.l 
The Reichstag was _so astonished by this 'counter-
attack' that it was speechless for a few seconds. Then, the 
storm broke. And for once, there was unanimity. From Left 
to Right - with the exception of the Conservatives, who 
politely applauded their hero - cries of 11 Shame 11 , 11 Revolu-
tion", were the immediate reaction. Speaker after speaker 
ascended the rostrum to denounce this offense to the dignity 
of the Assembly. The President was attacked for not having 
called von Oldenburg to order, for not having expelled him 
from the session. He replied that he had seen nothing un-
toward in this expression, 11 that the Representative had 
only, as it seems to me, given the utmost example of 
discipline which could be found in the Army o 112 Indeed, the 
"Bramarbas from Januschau" had tapped his pocket, and shouted: 
"Look here, look at the bomb we carry with us\ 11 The Con-
servatives were by now frankly alarmed at the reaction that 
had been produced. They hurriedly held - a council of war, 
and decided the best thing to do was to call von Heydebrand 
on the telephone and tell him what had happened. He was a leader 
with enough stature to calm the public, and the only one with 
enough influence on von Oldenburg to prevent him from aggravating 
1verhandlungen, CCLIX, 899. 
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the situation. But Heydebrand could not be reached, and the 
fraction had to suffer through the debate which followed, 
during which von Oldenburg spoiled what was left to be 
spoiled. 1 
But even von Oldenburg, rarely disturbed by others' 
opinions, thought it advisable to make himself "unavailable" 
until the furor had subsided. This was to take a long time. 
On the following morning, the Press was unanimous in 
chastising von Oldenburg for his lack or respect . From the 
Vorwarts, which naturally sensed this as an occasion Tto 
get even', came the following comments: 
Impertinent words .•.• delivered with the tone of a 
lieutenant of the Guard •.•• , Impertinence of' a Junker .•••• 
If the Prussian of'f'icers showed no more courage than · 
their boasting spokesman in the Reichstag, then the 
Prussian war spirit would be in sad shape.2 
The Berliner Tageblatt wrote: 
The most impertinent word ever spoken in the Reichstag ••••• 
This man is f'inished •••• He will never again, we hope, 
be able to produce himself' on the tribune of the 
Reichstag as the 'Prussian clown' 13 
The moderate Frankf'urter Zeitung said it was: 
•••. an off'ense to the Reichs Constitution, and to the 
f'ederative spirit of' the Reich •••• He who says such 
things is unworthy to represent the people, he is un-
worthy of his mandate tLt-
The semi-liberal Kolnische Zeit1m.g probably expressed the 
opinion of' the majority of' the people: 
lprankf'urter Zeitung, January JO, 1910. 
2vorwarts, January 30, "1910. 
3Berliner Tageblatt, January JO, 1910. 
4Frankf'urter Zeit1m.g, January 31, 1910. 
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Mr. von Oldenburg is a very peculiar person, who never 
'makes a sepulcher out of his heart' but always fires 
from the hip, and who does not care what other people 
will think of his speech •••.• He always speaks in sbirt 
s leeves •••• he is the 'enfant terrible• of the party, 
but this does not mean he cannot be taken seriously •••• 
for he expresses the opinions wbich his companions 
dare only say among friends. He is endowed with the 
bad tone of the non-com and the impertinence which 
is so often, and wrongly, ascribed to OU!:' officers in 
the funny papers .1 
Even the Free-Conservatives could not dare to express 
approval. The~ said that "while Mr. von Oldenburg is 
sympathetic as a person •••• utterances of this sort will 
only help the Social-Democrats. 112 The Reichsbote, also a 
Conservative newspaper, was of the opinion that 11 a few 
more such speeches, and voters will be driven in flocks to 
the Social-Democrats. 11 3 
The Conservative Press waited two full days before 
making a comment. Then, the Kreuzzeitung tried to smooth 
the troubled waters. 
When the manner of speaking of the orator is understood, 
his parable will be ta.ken as such, even as it was meant, 
and as he himself later explained be had meant it; 
that is to say, as the utmost consequence of the fact 
that the military oath is taken to the sovereign alone, 
and not also on the Constitution, as the civil-service 
oath ••••• This was the general understanding given to 
his wordsll.C 
Events, it seems, belied this last sentence. But the Kreuz-
zeitung went on to say that "it was an example intended to 
1 •• Kolnische Zeitung, January 31, 1910. 
2 
~' January 31, 1910. 
3Reichsbote, January 31, 1910. 
4Kreuzzeityns, January 31, 1910. Italics are mine. 
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produce a comical effect ••••• But, right away, the Socialists 
were startled, and rightly so. For they do not operate on 
constitutional grounds, but work towards the overthrow of 
the government." The best defensive still resided in the 
offensive1 The Konservative Korrespondenz struck the high 
note of the 'official reaction': 
Mr. von Oldenburg, as well as the whole Conservative 
Party, stands strongly on constitutional grounds. He 
is far removed even from merely suggesting acts of 
violence such as were described in his speech •••• He 
only wanted to express, unfortunately in a drastic and 
humorous fashion, the utmost duty of a soldier and 
officer .1 
This was perhaps so, but the country as a whole was unimpressed 
by such arguments. The phrase became a household word; 
it was even paraphrased on a music-hall stage. 2 
A further repercussion of this speech was the 
disavowal of von Oldenburg by the local Conservative Party 
branch, which, at the same time, denounced the alliance 
between the Party and the Bund der Landwirte, terming the 
latter an "egotistical and demagogic organization. 11 3 Von 
Oldenburg resigned his seat in the Landtag. 
Such outspoken utterances of the sort mentioned above 
obviously did nothing to heal the widening breach between 
the Emperor and his vassal. Von Oldenburg, by privilege, 
served as chamberlain of West Prussia. His duties, which 
1 Konservative Korr.espondenz, February 1, 1910. 
20ldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 111. 
3schulthess' Geschichtskalender, (1910), p. 361. 
See also Verhandlungen, CCLXII, 3553. 
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were anything but strenuous, consisted in attending upon the 
members of the imperial family when they passed through his 
province. The position was purely honorary, but performance 
of its duties usually carried with it a reward in the form 
of a decoration. However, when the Crown Prince had had 
the pleasure of von Oldenburg's attendance, and wanted to 
reward him in the customary manner, Bethmann-Hollweg stren-
uously objected to giving any imperial favor to a member of 
the 'loyal oppositionttl 
One of the stumbling blocks the Conservatives put 
into Betbmann-Hollwegts path was their opposition, in 1911, 
to the proposed Constitution for Alsace-Lorraine. The 
most offensive aspect of that document, in the eyes of von 
Oldenburg, was the provision requiring that the representatives 
of that province, once seated in the Bundesrat, would only 
be able to cast their vote against that of Prussia. This 
feature had been included at the insistence of the other 
federated States, who feared that the balance of power 
would otherwise be shifted too much in Prussia's favor. Von 
Oldenburg rose, once more, to speak against the measure. It 
was to be his last speech in the imperial Reichstag: 
We [the Conservatives] consider the matter to be 
a blow against the honor and the respect of Prussia 
••••• I speak here as a Prussian, and not as a German ••••. 
We cannot barter with the Social Democrats about the 
limits of the Emperor's power in Alsace-Lorraine ••••. 
Our respect for the position of our Imperial Lord, 
our conscience, the history of our country and of our 
party forbids us to make this deal.2 
loldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 113. 
2verhandlungen, CCLXVII, 7056. 
This time, however, the Conservatives had passed 
the zenith of their power. They could no longer muster 
majorities to defeat offensive Bills. The Constitution 
for Alsace-Lorraine passed the Reichstag, in spite of the 
intensely chauvinistic opposition of the Junkers. 
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What were von Oldenburg's opinions on foreign 
affairs? His membership in the Reichstag gave him first-
hand acquaintance with the foreign policies of the German 
government during a crucial period of pre-war history, and it 
is not astonishing that .we find mentioned in his writings 
and speeches some rather strong convictions about what ought 
to have been done. 
He favored a moderately strong fleet, powerful 
enough to challenge England's in case of a conflict.1 He 
always voted credits for the Navy without registering any 
dissent. His case for a big Navy was based on Germany 1 s 
necessity to play power politics in view of her increasing 
population. Of course, an Army large enough to wage war 
simultaneously on two fronts was essential. At the same time, 
however, he took the paradoxical stand that a very strong 
understanding with Russia should be maintained, to keep that 
countryts support in case of warl 
When a conflict with France threatened over the 
disputed territory in Morocco, he opposed going to war, for 
"undeveloped countries are a burden" !f 2 But a preventive war 
1schulthess' Geschichtskalender (1906), p. 77. 
20ldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 123. 
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to break up the Triple Alliance would have been advisable 
around 1905 or 1908'1 Its effect would probably have bean to 
throw England back into her 'splendid isolation', thereby 
again freeing Germany's hands in Europe. This point of view 
betrayed a somewhat elemental lack of understanding of the 
forces at work in European diplomacyt Unfortunately, this 
position was shared by the German Foreign Office. 
As it has been noted above, the fall of Bulow marked, 
ironically enough, the beginning of the Conservative Party's 
decline in power. It no longer kept pace with the mood of 
the time, and its reckless opposition alienated many of its 
formerly faithful voters. Furthermore, the Junkers' iron 
grip on the Conservative Party made itself felt more and 
more. Thus, in 1912, the Conservatives were to leave many 
of their trusted warriors on the electoral battlefields. 
One of the casualties was Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau. 
His otherwise docile electorate offered an unusually stiff 
resistance to his arguments. A rconspiracyr was afoot to 
defeat him. "Money played a big role." The Elbinger 
Neueste Nachrichten 2 which was in the ownership of a Radical, 
took the field against him. It accused him of lacking 
patriotism, of making false income-tax declarations, of crass 
egotism, and maintained that he was loyal to the King as long 
as the royal will coincided with his own. A denial of these 
charges brought a suit of libel from the newspaper, and 
Oldenburg was condemned to pay, a fine of 480 marks or spend 
32 days in jail. 1 
loldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 119. 
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Von Oldenburg's utterances during the campaign did 
not help his cause, 1 and he was defeated in the second round 
by a Free Conservative. For another person, this would have 
been a serious blow. But von Oldenburg gladly retired to his 
estate at Januschau, busied himself with counting his sows' 
sucklings, and confidently awaited the failure of parliamen-
tary government. He could not resist one last witticism. A 
Jewish member of the Radical Party sent him the following 
greeting upon learning of his defeat: 
The Chamberlain now feels at ease 
He stays home, and plants his peas. 
Von Oldenburg replied: 
With the peas I shall eat pork filet, 
Which Moses to your faith prohibited\ 
1
rt was during this campaign that he uttered the famous 
dictum: "Vox 32opuli I vox Rind vi eh. 11 On another occasion he 
remarked blandly that the questions directed at him did not 
interest him, and that, furthermore, he had to go home be-
cause his wife had cooked him his favorite dish, and it would 
grow coldl 
CHAPTER VI 
FOR PRUSSIA, AGAINST THE WORLD 
If his electoral defeat retired him from the political 
scene, von Oldenburg still faithfully attended the meetings 
of the Bund der Landwirte1s Executive Committee. It was at 
one of these meetings that Heinrich Class, the leader of the 
Pan-German League, came to plead the cause of his organiza-
tion. And thus it was that: 
[Von Oldenburg] now heard, to his great astonishment, 
that [the League] had existed for twenty years. He 
had never heard or it, did not know it existed. He 
expressed his joy at the existence of such a non-partisan 
organization, and was unconditionally fav£rable to a 
joint policy with the Bund der Landwirte. 
The rather bewildered Class ascribed ttiis ignorance 
to the 'secularization' of the public opinionl 
At the outbreak of the war, in 1914, the elderly 
gentleman jumped on a train to Berlin to offer his services to 
his country. Since he was less decrepit than some of the 
other members of his generation, he was given various assign-
ments on both fronts from 1914 to 1917. With the rank of 
Rittmeister (Major), he was first attached to the staff of the 
Crown Prince, that of the Fifth Army. In September 1914, he 
was transferred to the XVII Corps in East Prussia, where he 
served under Hindenburg. It was then he met the Marshal for 
lHeinrich Class, Wider den Strom (Leipzig: K. F. 
Koehler, 1932), p. 271. Italics mine. 
the first time. Their friendship lasted until Hindenburg's 
death in 1934-
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From 1915 to 1916, he served as an Ordnance officer 
of the XVII Corps on the Western Front. In 1916, he commanded 
the 341st Infantry Regiment on the Eastern Front. This Regi-
ment was engaged in front-line activities, and von Oldenburg 
was decorated with the Iron Cross First Class for bravery. 
In November 1917, he resigned from the service to organize 
the food supply. 
From the outset of the war, von Oldenburg became 
more and more outspoken in his opposition to Bethmann-Hollweg. 
The poor Chancellor was made the scape-goat for everything 
that went wrong, from the invasion of Belgium, which he 
"handled wrongn, to the hesitating policy pursued concerning 
the U-Boat warfare on a large scale. In that respect, von 
Oldenburg introduced a motion in the Herrenhaus in 1917, 
praising the Government for its decision to resort to un-
conditional submarine warfare.l "There never has been a 
minister who did such strong and lasting harm to his sovereign 
and his country as he", 2 was the merciless appraisal of the 
Chancellor's activities during the war. Everyone knew, of 
course, that the war had been forced upon his peace-loving 
Emperor by aggressive neighbors, even if Bethmann-Hollweg, 
by his clumsiness, made it appear otherwise. 
1oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerunge~, p. 178. 
2 
~-, p. 193. 
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Sometime in March, 1916, von Oldenburg became personally 
convinced that the Chancellor was no longer worthy of leading 
the Reich's policies. Consequently, after ·consultation with -
of all people, Blilow and Tirpitz, he proposed the latter as 
Chancellor, first to Hindenburg and Ludendorff, then to the 
Crown Prince and the Kaiser. This attempt met with failure, 
for Tirpitz, blamed for the failure of the German; Navy, was 
dismissed by William II. 
In spite of all the glorious promises of self-
sufficiency advanced by the Junkers as the reason for higher 
agricultural tariffs, the food situation in Germany was 
rapidly deteriorating. What were the remedies proposed by 
von Oldenburg? 
As the representative of the Bund der Landwirte on 
the Food Council, von Oldenburg stated that the objective of 
the~ was not "to hold the balance of power in Germany.n 
It was understood from the beginning that the State had to 
have a hand in the regulation of agricultural production, but 
this invasion had to be held within reasonable limits. As 
a matter of fact, the government had already gone a little 
too far. In the first of a series of thrBe letters, pub-
lished from August 1916 to August 1917, he wrote: 
As soon as something still shows a sign of life, a 
society with monopolisitc powers descends upon it. It 
rents a floor in a building, buys some swivel-chairs, 
has its picture taken, obtains 40,000 mark salaries and 
soon thereafter, the object either disappears completely 
from the market, or is obtainable only at prices which 
would make black-marketeers blushtl 
lneutsche T~szeitung, September 2, 1916. 
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One wit stated that ''the government would as soon 
have regulated the weather." However, von Oldenburg, s 
tolerant attitude towards government interference had its 
limit ations. According to the Bund 1 s own admission, profit 
was still the Junkers' paramount objective: low prices kept 
much of the food supply from the official marketst Conse-
quently, von Oldenburg, with the approval of the Bund rs 
Executive Committee, made the following recommendations for 
improved food supply: 
a) no ceiling on fowl, malt and pork; 
b) no interference with private slaughtering, nor with 
the raising of cattle; 
c) prevention of profiteering.1 
That the profit motive was still uppermost in the 
Junkers' minds can be seen from the following letter, which 
von Oldenburg sent to the then Home Secretary, von Loebell, 
on April 15, 1915: 
Your Excellency, Dear Fritz, 
About to return to my job in Poland, I thank God 
I shall be free of all these rows about foodstuffs and 
with civilian officials. It is now really unbearable 
in the country with these constantly changing regulations. 
I am going to let 200 acres go out of cultivationL and 
lots of others are doing the same, because of the uncer-
tainty of the CLOES, and:tlie fixed prices are far mor~ 
than I can stand. Potato prices are now comparatively 
reasonable;half of the pork will get rotten in the brine 
casks. Disaffection in the country is rife, and will 
break out seriously after the war; in addition to that, 
confidence in the Supreme Command of the Army is dwindling; 
confidence in the Supreme Civil Administration went long 
ago. You know thatt Finis.2 
-------·-
101denburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, pp. 156-157. 
2Philip Scheideman, The Making of New Germanz (New York, 
1929), p. 270. Italics mine. 
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After all, JO million tons of potatoes would have 
been available, if only the producers had been let alone, and 
the government had been prepared to pay 5 marks a ton for 
themt 1 
These words were uttered in the face of a starving 
people. They eJg?ressed the complete selfishness of the great 
Prussian landholder, to whom "the right price" was the only 
incentive for feeding his hungry fellow-citizens. The sacri-
fices of the fighting men and of the civilian population -were 
ignored for a small margin of profit. 
But another, and albeit. larger, threat loomed on the 
horizon of von Oldenburg's Junker serenity in the spring of 
1917. Bethmann-Hollweg, realizing that the unjust three-class 
franchise demoralized troops and civilians alike, thought to 
forestall any thoughts of revolution. He introduced in the 
Herrenhaus an electoral reform Bill, known as the Easter 
Message of 1917. The Bill called for universal and . equal 
suffrage, to be granted in Prussia immediately after victory 
was achieved. To the Junkers, this appeared as a resurrection 
of the vital threat of the years 1909 - 1910. For "who wanted 
to control Germany had first to control Prussia. 112 And the 
Junker rule of Prussia, maintained only by the undemocratic 
three-class franchise, would collapse if the reform were 
successful. 
1 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen.p. 171. 




Naturally, this was considered as a coup d'etat by 
the Conservatives. Countermeasures were swift and violent: 
von Oldenburg first persuaded the Crown Prince to oppose the 
measure and then he attacked it himself in the Prussian 
Upper House. Far from considering the three-class franchise 
as ideal, he considered it, on the contrary, to be only the 
lesser of two evils.1 The problem could not be solved on 
the English pattern, for England was an island, and its 
population had a "national instinct". Even though there were 
grumblings deep in the mass of the people, "my friends and 
I could not consider giving ground, but rather had to make 
our stand firmly, whatever the cost might be1 112 Blindness, 
arrogance and lack of touch with the people were betrayed 
in that last sentence. The "friend of the people" had 
certainly travelled a long way. But von Oldenburg was willing 
to "compromise"~ after the war, plurality could be granted. 
This, combined with the removal of the Emperor's power to 
pack the Herrenhaus, would still leave the Junkers an 
effective way to block controversial legislation. 
The first step in defeating the Bill seemed to be 
simple enough: obtain its author's dismissalL Ever since his 
intrigues of 1916, von Oldenburg had attempted to provoke 
the Chancellor 1 s 'resignation•. During the weeks immediately 
~receding and following the resignation in July, 1917, the 
urgency of such a step was first expressed, then relief at 
the eventts happening. The resignation, he wrote, "reminded 
1 Ibid., pp. 184 ff. 
2 
~-, p. 187. 
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one or the March days of 1848". The Junkers had teamed up 
with the High Command into pressuring t he Imtperaz- to dismiss 
his Chancellor. Von Oldenburg made the cryptical, and yet 
cynical comment, that this was "highly revolutionary, and 
bound to bring about the Republic 1111 He, von Oldenburg, 
washed his hands of the whole affair. 
His comments on the political situation of these 
stormy days in the summer of 1917 are revealing. "It is a 
scandal •••. The spineless political leadership which let 
itself be influenced in everything by the other States and 
Social Democrats." But more astonishing even is the exclama-
tion that "the ways of God are wonderful •••• the Prussian 
spirit embraces the world, and the King of Prussia is losing 
his crown. 11 2 Whether von Oldenburg and his friends realized 
that this impending loss was their own fault, is a debatable 
point 1 
On the occasion of the last convention of the Bund 
der Landwirte, February 18, 1918, he delivered a speech that 
was to prove the swan song of the organization, and of his 
own ideals. It read in part: 
If our diplomatists have failed, this will be found to 
have been due to the instructions given .them by Herr von 
Betbmann ••••• Bethrnann has made it as di f f icult as 
possible for the Army to conquer. His statement about the 
wrong done to Belgium is one that no rain can wash away. 
~e did not need to know that Prussia was justified in 
occupying that fortress, but he was bound to know it •••• 
[The Reihhstag] has stabbed our Army in the back with 
this abominable Peace Resolution ••••• One of the many con-
fused ideas of Bethmann was his wish to make the Social 
1Letter to his wife, dated August 2, 1917. Quoted in: 
Mantis, "Brief des Januschauers", Der Turmer, October 19, 1917. 
2 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 184. 
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Democrats competent to govern ••• ·• This war is a war for 
~d domination, and though it may be hara to wage, It 
must be fought out to victory, and the victory must be 
exploited ••••• It is asserted that Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff have interfered in politics. No, their 
gig~tic__E..e.EE._onsibilit? gives them the right to assure 
themsel'"ves that the Kaiser and tne Kin still decides. 
The German hear eats •••• at Great Hea quarters. 
This, then, was the true von Oldenburg: militarist, 
expansionist, favoring a military dictatorship. In the 
invasion of Belgium, for example, the fault had not bean to 
invade the country, it had been Bethamnnrs ''blundering"t 
In the late fall of 1918, von Oldenburg realized that 
the worsening military situation, coupled with the unrest 
created by the repeal of the electoral reform Bill in July, 
would result in the fall of the House of Hohenzollern. 
Queried about his own readiness for quelling a revolution, 
he replied: 
When the people are starving, and one lets them be 
shot, then it is wrong. But if they are well-fed, 
and just want to play at revolting because they 
refuse to pay the prices necessary for production, it is 
justifiable to shoot themt2 
The German people were starving to death; von Oldenburg and 
his Conservative friends had to look for a more peaceful 
solution to the impending revolution. 
On October 26, 1918, with Germany's allies collapsing, 
or already out of the fight, the military situation was deemed 
hopeless, even by Ludendorff. A speedy armistice was the 
only hope of salvaging what was left of the Empire. But the 
1 Ralph H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire, Vol. II, 
Hoover War Library Publications - no. 2 (Stanford, Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1932), pp. 321-323. 
2 Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen, p. 158. 
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l2nperor stood in the way, for the Allies would never negotiate 
as long as he was on the throne. Therefore, the staunch 
stalwarts of the Junker class did some plotting of their own 
to persuade the hesitating Emperor to abdicate, and thereby 
shore up the tottering building. First, as a measure of 
desperation to stave off the revolution, the equal suffrage 
Bill was passed. Then, von Wangenheim-Kleinspiegel, 
. 1 
accompanied by von Oldenburg, went to Army Headquarters in 
Berlin, to persuade Hindenburg to take over the reins of 
government as a dictator. Sut the 'Old Gentleman• refused 
the job, partly because of his loyalty to his Emperor, and 
Partly because of the hopelessness of the situation. Now, 
even von Oldenburg was willing to try his hand at saving 
2 the system for the Junkers. But it was too late. They who 
had sown the wind had reaped a storm. For once, no amount 
of reed-like riding with the storm would at this time save 
the plant from being uprooted. Negative opposition always 
ends by turning against its authors, and the recent develop-
ment proved to be no exception. 
The &lperor abdicated on November 9, in the face of 
mutinies and revolution. The plot had failed, and von 
Oldenburg faded from the public scene, a defeated man. He 
returned home to Januschau, to rest and recuperate from the 
fatigues of the war. He was now 63 years of age, and could 
look back on a ·life rich with experience. He had seen the 
1 
~-, p. 206. 
2 Ibid. , p • 205. 
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Empire at its zenith, he had helped hold it there for a while, 
then had worked very hard at bringing it down, unwittingly 
perhaps. And down it crashed, in the bleak November days 
of 1918. 
Upon his return home, he discovered there had been 
sonte l oose revolutionary talk about sharing the wealth, on 
the part of one of his field-hands. Authoritarian to the 
last, sti 11 the II only one who could make politics on my 
estate", he sought out the fellow in the fields, and ma.de 
him retract his statements by threatening him with a public 
caning .1 
1 Ibid ., p. 209. 
CONCLUSION 
What historical conclusions are to be derived from 
von Oldenburg's life? This study has sought to accomplish a 
two-fold purpose: to give a sketch of a Junker's life in the 
Empire of William II, a life which, with its many humorous 
sides, it is hoped was not too dull reading; and secondly, 
to show what one of the big East Elbian landholders thought, 
politically and socially, during one of the crucial periods 
of Germany's history. For it was a time just as important 
for the German people as Bismarck 1 s era of unification. The 
years 1888 to 1914 indeed destroyed most of Bismarck's 
herculean effort to build the German people into a nation. 
The struggle between a rising industry and a powerfully 
entrenched agrarian party led to great bitterness and internal 
squabbles. It would have taken stronger personalities than 
those of William II and his Chancellors to promote a reasonable 
amount of understanding between the two contending parties. 
Sacrifices on both sides should have been evenly distributed, 
and not assessed fully on the one, and then on the other. 
But one of the main failures of the politicians of 
the period was to make the Junkers understand that they, too, 
could play an important role in the affairs of State. By 
antagonizing them with low-tariff trade-treaties, and pro-
viding them with no help against f ormidable foreign competit i on, 
one cannot help blaming the German goverhment and s:ympathizing 
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to some extent with the agrarians in their opposition to it. 
Embittered, and feeling persecuted, they resorted to pressure 
politics to achieve their end. And this is where one's 
sympathy must leave them. That ~he aristocratic leaders of 
a people never realized that their mission was more than just 
a preservation of the status quo, that they failed to let 
progress take its course in political and social areas, this 
must be recorded to their eternal discredit. Though the 
Junker did not follow the pattern of the vast majority of the 
European nobility, and stayed on their lands inste.ad, their 
way of life had nevertheless become outmoded in a modern 
State. The very pride they took in "personal service" 
showed how far they were behind times. The twentieth 
century is not one in which one performs "personal services", 
but it is rather one in which privileges are abolished, and 
equalization made necessary. By fighting this moven~nt, by 
. failing to gauge its strength, the Junker made of himself an 
"anachronistic curiosity". 
The main failure of von Oldenburg and his fellow-
Junkers is that they never did realize that a shift had taken 
place, from an agricultural to an industrial State. On the 
contrary, they stole the very weapons forged to accomplish 
it, and turned them against the realization of a new Germ.any 
on a more popular basis. Their use of parliamentary pro-
cedure was masterly, but unfortunately applied to the wrong 
purpose. One cannot discuss the use of the means employed 
to attain an end, if the end itself is wrong. 
What better parting shot could be delivered by the 
---
old Januschauer himself than this advice to a would-be 
dictator, Kapp, who proposed that he join him in a march 
on Berlin: 
You must take riding lessons, for the one who 
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wants to conquer Berlin must ride through the Branden-
burger Tor.l 
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